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 1 
Summary 
This thesis deals with various aspects of international investment law. 
Bilateral or regional investment treaties together with international 
customary law mostly govern international investment law. The area of 
customary law is not harmonized leaving it uncertain and unsafe for 
investors. Countries therefore started to negotiate bilateral investment 
treaties, BITs, in the late 1950´s as a way of promoting investments and 
making them more secure.Through the BITs it has become possible for 
investors to directly file a claim against the government of a host state for a 
breach of a BIT. The dispute will in many cases be settled though 
arbitration, e.g. by ICSID. Arbitration through any other institute than 
ICSID will most likely be confidential.  
 
There has been a lot of critique against the system of investment treaty 
arbitration. Gus van Harten is one of the most criticising authors within the 
area of law. He claims that courts, not arbitrators, should solve regulatory 
disputes that may affect the public. The arbitration process under BITs 
cannot fulfil core features of dispute settlement since it lacks in 
accountability, openness, coherence and independence. The way of settling 
disputes through investment treaty arbitration is unlike any other system of 
international law, since it gives a private actor a lot of power. Van Harten 
further claims that there is a bias in favour of the investors. This due to the 
arbitrator’s lack of tenure, which makes them dependent on prospective 
claims, claims that only the investors can bring. He also means that the 
system can put a strain on the host state economies due to its high awards 
and strong enforceability. It is also open for forum shopping according to 
van Harten.  
 
There are many authors and legal practitioners that are in favour of the 
system. Some of them claim that van Harten is lacking evidence for what he 
is claiming. They mean that the system functions well, at least if you 
compare it to the previous system of diplomatic protection. When using 
diplomatic protection the investors where dependent on the home state to 
raise a claim against a host state for committing misconduct against the 
investor. The claimed bias in favour of investor by van Harten does not 
show in arbitral awards according to his critics.  
 
To be able to evaluate whose arguments are the correct ones a case study on 
the country involved in most investment treaty arbitration, Argentina was 
conducted. The study shows that van Harten has got a point in a lot of his 
critique; however what he claims is exaggerated. The system of investment 
treaty arbitration is still young and developing with numerous flaws. 
Nonetheless it is better then the last one, and functions too well to be 
removed. Removing it would risk a decrease in foreign investments due to 
an uncertainty regarding the protection. 
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Sammanfattning 
Detta examensarbete behandlar olika aspekter av internationell 
investeringsrätt. Bilaterala eller regionala investeringsavtal tillsammans med 
internationell sedvanerätt reglerar mestadels rättsområdet. Sedvanerätten är 
inte harmoniserad på området vilket gör den osäker för investerare. För att 
främja investeringar och göra investeringar säkrare började länder förhandla 
bilaterala investeringsavtal, BITs, i slutet av 1950-talet. Genom BITs har det 
blivit möjligt för investerare att väcka talan direkt mot en stat för avtalsbrott. 
Tvisten kommer i många fall att avgöras genom skiljedom, t.ex. av ICSID. 
Skiljedom av annan institution än ICSID kommer sannolikt att vara 
konfidentiell. 
 
Det har riktats en hel del kritik mot skiljedomsförfarandet i 
investeringsavtalen. Gus Van Harten är en av de mest kritiserande 
författarna. Han hävdar att domstolar, inte skiljedomare, ska lösa tvister som 
kan påverka allmänheten. Skiljedomsförfarandet i BIT uppfyller inte 
grundläggande funktioner för tvistlösning, eftersom den brister i 
ansvarstagande, öppenhet, samstämmighet och oberoende enligt van Harten. 
Sättet att lösa investeringstvister genom skiljedom är olikt något annat 
system inom internationell rätt mycket på grund av att systemet ger privata 
aktörer mycket makt. Van Harten hävdar vidare att det finns en partiskhet 
till förmån för investerarna. Detta på grund av skiljemännens brist på 
ämbetsinnehav, vilket gör dem beroende av framtida fall. Då det enbart är 
investeraren som kan stämma värdlandet dömer skiljedomare till fördel för 
investeraren för att säkra framtida uppdrag. Han säger också att systemet 
kan innebära påfrestningar på ekonomin i värdländerna på grund av 
systemets höga skadestånd och starka verkställbarhet. Systemet möjliggör 
även för forum shopping enligt van Harten. 
 
Det finns många författare och jurister som är positiva till systemet som 
hävdar att van Harten saknar bevis för vad han påstår. De menar att det 
fungerar bra, åtminstone om man jämför med det tidigare systemet med 
diplomatiskt skydd. Vid användning av diplomatiskt skydd är investerarna 
beroende av hemlandet för att väcka talan mot ett värdland om detta begår 
brott mot det bilaterala investeringsavtalet. Partiskheten till förmån för 
investerare som van Harten påstår visas inte genom existerande skiljedomar 
enligt hans kritiker. 
 
För att kunna utvärdera vems argument som är korrekt har en fallstudie av 
det land med flest skiljedomar emot sig, Argentina, genomförts. Studien 
visar att van Harten har rätt i mycket av sin kritik, det han påstår är dock 
överdrivet. Systemet med skiljedomar inom investeringsrätten är fortfarande 
ungt och utvecklas ständigt. Det har många brister, men är bättre än de förra. 
Systemet fungerar för bra för att ersättas med ett nytt, ett byte skulle riskera 
en minskning av utländska investeringar då skyddet skulle vara osäkert.  
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Abbreviations 
BIT   Bilateral Investment Treaty 
ECT   Energy Charter Treaty 
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of Investment Disputes 
ITA Investment Treaty Arbitration 
NAFTA North American Free Trade 
Agreement 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Theme and purpose 
The theme of this thesis will be international investment law and investment 
treaty arbitration. The purpose is to face criticism made against the area of 
law by Gus van Harten, by looking at cases involving Argentina as well as 
texts written my persons with a lot of knowledge in the subject area. 
Argentina had a severe financial crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
resulting in a high number as submitted cases under the ICSID Convention 
for arbitration. Therefore Argentina will be an ideal country as a case study. 
The objective of this thesis is to be able to evaluate if the critique made is 
legitimate or if the author of the critique has missed out on core facts.  
1.2 Methodology and material 
This thesis will mainly be based on traditional legal methods. However, 
since the area is a bit unique, so will the thesis. There will be a case study on 
Argentina where empirical facts will be analysed and gathered in statistics 
to draw new conclusions. So the method will be both traditional legal 
method and empirical research with statistics.  
 
The material used is case law mainly from arbitral tribunals under the 
ICSID Convention and treaties – both bilateral and global ones. Literature 
and articles written by persons skilled in the subject will also be a source of 
information and help in interpreting cases, treaties and the system as a 
whole. Another source of information comes from reports written by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, focusing on the 
issues and development of foreign investment.   
 
Transparency in the way the data has been collected is important when 
performing statistical analysis; therefore this thesis will strive to disclose 
every step of the procedure so that it is clear where all the numbers and 
statistics derive from. Most information gathered is found on either ICSIDs 
own webpage, icsid.worldbank.org or on a database webpage for investment 
treaty cases, italaw.com. These two web pages contain all public 
information relating to investment treaty arbitration. On the ICSID webpage 
one can find lists of all pending and concluded cases with information on 
the proceedings and on the tribunals, including the arbitrators name and 
origin. On italaw.com one can read most investment treaty awards, however 
one may also read decision made by the tribunals such as on jurisdiction and 
on liability.  
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1.3 Disposition 
The first chapter of the thesis will explain the basics of the legal area of 
international investment law. To understand the rest of the thesis it is 
necessary to elaborate on the system of bilateral investments treaties, BITs, 
and the way arbitration has become a core section in each BIT as the way of 
settling upcoming investment disputes. Following this chapter will be a 
section that criticises the system of investment treaty arbitration. The third 
chapter will discuss articles that critique van Harten and the fourth chapter 
will respond to this critique. To evaluate if the two aspects of critique are 
legitimate or lacks support in theory the fifth chapter will look at arbitral 
cases concerning Argentina as well as litterateur and articles on the subject. 
As the last part of the thesis there will be a conclusion on whether the 
critique was legitimate or not.  
1.4 Delimitations 
This thesis will not process all areas of international investment law. There 
will initially be a general introduction on the area however after the 
introduction the thesis will solely focus on investment treaty arbitration. The 
second chapter will centre on critique made by Gus van Harten, the scope of 
this thesis would become too wide and not fit within the time frames if it 
also discussed critique made by others. The decision on why van Harten has 
been selected is based on the fact that he is one of the most criticising 
authors within this subject of law. In the fifth chapter the critique will be 
faced with case law and literature with the spotlight on Argentina. It would 
not be possible, during the limited time at hand, to discuss all cases brought 
in the area of investment treaties, therefore the focus will be on Argentina. 
The reason that Argentina will be the case study is that Argentina is the one 
country since the start of investment treaty arbitration involved in most 
arbitral proceedings relating to foreign investments and investment treaties, 
this due to a financial crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000. It will not be 
possible to highlight all of the cases that Argentina has been involved in, 
therefore only some will be discussed in more detail. There are some cases 
that stand out from the rest, e.g. the once with awards, and these are the 
awards that are more discussed.  
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2 International Investment Law 
2.1 Introduction to Investment Law 
To fully understand the scope of this thesis, it is required to go thought the 
basics of how international investment law is structured and implemented in 
today’s global world. International investment law is an area of law that 
protects investments made in another country than the home country of the 
investor, e.g. when a British company builds a factory in Kenya. The area of 
investment law differs from many other areas of international law since it is 
mostly based on investment agreements, such as bilateral investment 
treaties, BITs, or regional investment treaties instead of international 
customary law. Global treaties govern most other areas of international law 
in combination with international customary law. Besides the BITs and 
regional treaties there is also other kinds of bilateral treaties governing 
investments, these contain a chapter on investments, the most important is 
the free trade agreements used primarily by the US and the economic 
partnership and cooperation treaties most commonly used by Japan.1  
2.2 Bilateral Investment Treaties, BITs 
2.2.1 General information 
The BITs are the dominating form of investment agreement in today’s 
globalized world. BITs govern the investment relations between two states 
and are concluded as a way of protecting and promoting foreign 
investment.2 At the beginning of 2010 there were 5939 investment 
agreements in force in the world, including 2750 BITs. Some countries, for 
example Germany with 135 signed BITs, have a high number of BITs, 
while other, like Ireland, have none.3  
2.2.2 History of BITs 
In the beginning of the 20th century and end of the 19th a dispute started 
regarding which obligations a host state owed towards a foreign national 
and its properties within the host states territories. On one side were the 
investment exporting states that argued that a minimum standard of 
treatment had developed in the international customary law, meaning a 
minimum level of treatment that a foreign national can not fall below, and 
on the other side was the investment importing countries that disputed the 
minimum standard of treatment and claimed that it was the national law of 
the host country that was effective, not a general rule.4 The disagreement 
                                                 
1 Salacuse, 2010, p 2.  
2 Salacuse, 2010, p. 1.  
3 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010, p. 82.  
4 Romson, 2012, p. 58.  
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originated mainly from the different ideas regarding whether a host state 
was obliged to compensate for expropriation. The dispute resulted in several 
failed attempts in codifying treatment of foreign nationals and their 
property. And it is still not established in international customary law 
whether there is a minimum standard of treatment.5  
2.2.3 Minimum standards of treatment 
The development of BITs derive from the fact that there was a persistent 
disagreement on the form and content of international customary law 
standards relating to the treatment of aliens and their property. This had lead 
to bilateral treaties being concluded as a way of promoting and protecting 
foreign investments.6 BITs have become a regime designed to restate 
international minimum standards of treatment of foreign investors in treaty 
form. It is expected by investment-exporting states that the host states oblige 
to certain levels of treatment such as the most-favoured nation standard, the 
national treatment standard and the fair and equitable treatment standard 
while being a party to a BIT.7 The most favoured nation treatment ensures 
that investors and their investments from one country are treated in the same 
way, or at least not less favourable, as investors and investments from 
another country. The national treatment standard says that investors or 
investments from another state are to be treated in the same manner as, or at 
least not less favourable than, the investors or investments from inside the 
country. Fair and equitable treatment has been interpreted in various ways 
and has protected investors and investments where other standards have 
failed. The three standards of treatment are included in most BITs and has 
become a norm under investment agreements.8 There is one provision in 
most BITs that says that only investments that has been established and 
admitted in the territory of the host state in accordance with the host 
countries domestic legislation will be protected under the BIT, this to limit 
the application.9 
 
A last provision contained in most BITs is the protection against unlawful 
expropriations. A nationalization or expropriation is only lawful when it is 
done for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory way, following the due 
process of law against compensation. The criterion of compensation is the 
most disputed of all standards. Some states mean that the compensation 
ought to be appropriate and just, while others, mainly investment exporting 
countries, considers the compensation standard a lot higher, they believe 
that is should be prompt, adequate and effective based on the market value 
of the expropriated investment.10 The US and some other European 
countries that traditionally has been investment exporting countries has not 
fully succeeded with making the standard of prompt, adequate and effective 
                                                 
5 Hjälmroth C, 2011, p.10. 
6 Hildelang S, 2004, p. 789. 
7 UNCTAD, 2007, p. XII. 
8 Muchlinski P, 2008, p. 22.  
9 Yannaca-Small, 2010, p. 7. 
10 UNCTAD, Taking of Property, 2000, p 5.  
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a generally accepted standard within the international customary law. 
However, it becomes more and more common for the market value to be the 
amount for compensation internationally, so the term adequate is roughly 
incorporated in international customary law, but it is not accepted that the 
compensation is to be prompt and effective.11Another core feature of BITs 
are the dispute settlement provision, more about this further on in this thesis.  
2.2.4 Investor and investments 
Each BIT also contains provisions regulating the definitions of the two 
concepts “investor” and “investment”. BITs have different definitions on 
what equals an investment; some are generous in its extent while others 
have a narrow application.12 In a BIT with a broad scope it is not only 
foreign direct investment that is protected, also indirect investments, such as 
shareholding, rests under the protection of the BIT in force.13  
2.2.5 The evolution of BITs 
The creation of BITs as an investment regime took off after the World War 
II, this due to governmental failure in codifying the subject area during the 
ongoing decolonization. The first initiative was the Havana Charter on 
Trade and Employment in 1948 and was intended on creating the 
International Trade Organisation. Several governments in developing 
countries were hostile to certain provision, this slowed down the negotiation 
and after a while the driving force of the charter, the U.S., lost interest and 
the charter was never adopted.14 Non-governmental initiatives were started 
in the 1950’s, which signalled a number of shifts in investment protection 
with the aim of increasing economic development. Private actors such as 
German business men and lawyers, under the leadership of Hermann Abs, 
Chairman of Deutsche Bank and Lord Shawcross, former attorney general 
of Great Brittan created two drafts on protection of investments abroad in 
the 1960´s, however they never got adopted by the OECD15. By the time 
OECD adopted a resolution on the protection of foreign property, countries 
in Europe had already started to negotiate BITs. Germany was the first 
country to conclude an agreement, with Pakistan in 1959. They did it as a 
way of entering the world trade again after World War II while other 
countries did it to protect themselves during the cold war. Today many 
developing countries negotiate BITs as a way of showing that it is safe to 
invest there.16 Many BITs have similar purposes and content since they are 
often designed after looking at one of the above named drafts.17 
 
                                                 
11 Dolzer & Schreuer, 2008, p. 91. 
12 US- Honduras BIT, North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA and Energy 
Charter Treaty.  
13 ECT Art 1(6); ASEAN Agreement for Promotion and Protection of Investment Art 1(3); 
UNCTAD Scope and definition, 1999, p. 18ff. 
14 Dugan and others, 2008, p. 48. 
15 Wong, 2006, p. 145f. 
16 Hjälmroth, 2011, p. 11. 
17 McLachlan QC and others, 2007, p. 26.  
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There was an enormous increase in BITs during the 1990’s and the number 
of BITs is still growing. Historically BITs have been concluded between 
one developed and one developing country. However, today the number of 
BITs between two developing countries is increasing since also developing 
countries have expanded their foreign investments.18 Foreign investment 
today is, due to the very high number of BIT’s, most likely protected 
primarily by a treaty and not by international customary law alone.  
 
The obligations that a state owes according to international customary law 
are not necessarily the same as the obligation undertaken by a treaty and 
vice versa.19 However, when interpreting a treaty you need to look at the 
customary law according to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969.20 International law is a legal system, and 
investment treaties are governed by it.21 
 
International investment treaties are not just expressions of good will by 
states; they are binding instruments of international law capable of imposing 
enforceable legal obligations on governments in host countries. It is 
therefore important for executives, bankers and lawyer to be aware of which 
investment agreement is in force when dealing with foreign investment.22 
BITs prevail over domestic law, however the agreements usually allow for 
exceptions from the investment protection when it is in the interest of 
national security.23 
2.3 Foreign investment disputes 
2.3.1 History 
When foreign investments first took off, the legal rules governing it 
assumed a tripartite set of actors, the home state, the host state and the 
investor. However, it was only the two states that had legal standing. 
Traditionally it has been states that are the principal subjects of international 
law. The issues rising out of foreign investments was settled by diplomatic 
protection, leaving the investor unrecognized as a subject of international 
law.24 In case of a dispute, it was needed that the domestic remedies of the 
host state had been exhausted and that the investor did posses the nationality 
of the home state for diplomatic protection to occur. States were very active 
in exercising diplomatic protection around the 19th century in various ways, 
such as diplomatic settlement of claims, gun-point diplomacy and ad hoc 
tribunals. The justification was that an injury against a national company in 
another country was an injury to the home country itself.25  
                                                 
18 UNCTAD, 2007, p. 15. 
19 McLachlan, 2008, p.364. 
20 McLachlan, 2008, p.371. 
21 McLachlan, 2008, p.365. 
22 Salacuse, 2010, p. 3f.  
23 Folsom, Gordon and Spangole, 2000, p. 204. 
24 Muchlinski, 2008, p. 6.  
25 McLachlan, 2008, p.365f. 
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Diplomatic Protection is often one of the primary choices of dispute 
settlement today, before resorting to the main dispute settlement body, 
arbitration.26 The order of the dispute settlement is often addressed as to 
treat negotiation first, then arbitration, and finally, judicial settlement, 
without paying much need to conciliation. Diplomatic protection is still used 
since it can be enough that the government of the home state notes in a 
phone call to the host state that its actions regarding a particular investment 
goes against a BIT for a change to occur. This saves a lot of time and money 
for all parties involved.27  
 
Disputes between states and private actors may rise out of many different 
contexts and be of different size and importance. However, primarily 
disputes will rise when an investor considers the home country to be lacking 
in the protection on investments established in a treaty.28 The way disputes 
are settled under international investment law has changed after the adoption 
of the ICSID convention29 in 1965.30 Through the system created by the 
convention, host states have allowed investors through BIT’s the possibility 
to bring claims under direct dispute settlement procedures. An investor may 
bring a host state to arbitration for misconduct, either at an ICSID tribunal 
or other arbitral institution. Host states have therefore accepted to grant 
investors a certain standard of treatment.31 It may be said that the host state 
by agreement has replaced the diplomatic protection by investor-held rights 
of action against the host state. The home state has no residual interest in 
these new rights and obligations.32 The system created by the ICSID 
convention has reached huge success, particularity in the 21st century. It is 
likely that it will grow even bigger due to the amount of new BITs coming 
into force continuously.33 The development from diplomatic protection to 
investment treaty arbitration derives mainly from the lack of security that 
the diplomatic protection gave. If the home country did not have an interest 
in raising a claim, the investor had no chance at receiving damages. This 
uncertainty was a big issue, not only for the investors, since foreign direct 
investments are a way of increasing economic development. If the investors 
did not have a safeguard against misconduct by the host state there was a 
risk that they would end their foreign investments, which would risk the 
economic development. Therefore there was a need for a safer system, so 
that investors would feel secure enough to invest in foreign states, helping 
the economic development.34  
 
                                                 
26 Salacuse, 2010, p 360. 
27 Sornarajah, 2000, p. 18. 
28 Salacuse, 2010, p 354. 
29 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
other States -ICSID Convention.  
30 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 692. 
31 Muchlinski , 2008, p. 6f. 
32 Zachary, 2003, p. 282.  
33 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 692. 
34 Meyer, 2008, p 51f. 
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There are other forms of dispute settlement than arbitration under the ICSID 
Convention and diplomatic protection, such as national and international 
courts, other arbitration or conciliation.35 However, it is negotiation (as a 
form of diplomatic protection or between the investor and host state), 
arbitration and judicial settlement that stand out as significant in the 
settlement of disputes.36 
2.3.2 Arbitration 
Arbitration became a well-used method of dispute settlement after the 
World War II with the increase of international business activity. In 1958 
came the New York Convention37 and 1966 the UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules, two conventions governing arbitrational rules. The former is ratified 
by 142 countries as of 2008. Member states commit their courts to enforce 
international arbitration agreements and awards in accordance with specific 
rules and conditions. The UNCITRAL Arbitration rules is a set of rules on 
arbitration not tied to a specific arbitral institution. The two sets of legal 
rules were intended for commercial arbitration, but have become applicable 
on investment treaties and investor-state arbitration.38 However, one 
problem arising out of this was the difficulties of initiating arbitration 
against a sovereign state with immunity. Private actors were not considered 
to hold legal personality under international law, which made it very hard to 
resort to arbitration in investor-state disputes. Enabling investor-state 
dispute under the ICSID Convention, adopted in 1965, solved this 
problem.39  
2.3.3 National courts 
If a BIT or other investment agreement does not contain any regulations 
governing dispute settlement, the arising dispute will normally fall under the 
jurisdiction of national courts, most likely in the host state. The ICSID 
Convention does not rule out national jurisdiction per se, therefore it is 
possible for the disputing parties to agree on jurisdiction in a national court 
even when the ICSID Convention is the primary method of dispute 
settlement under a BIT. However, when the parties have agreed to ICSID 
arbitration it is not possible to resort to domestic courts. A contracting party 
may require that domestic remedies have been exhausted before consenting 
to arbitration under ICSID.40 However, it is only a very small amount of 
BITs that contain a provision on exhausted remedies.41  
                                                 
35 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 692. 
36 Sornarajah, 2000, p. 18.   
37 The New York Convention, 1958. 
38 Salacuse, 2010, p 370. 
39 Salacuse, 2010, p 372. 
40 ICSID Convention 2006, preamble.  
41 Schreuer, 2001, Art 26, para 99. 
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2.3.4 Overlap between national courts and arbitration 
The different systems sometimes overlap in its jurisdiction making it 
possible for the dispute to be settled by different forums. The existents of 
various dispute settlement procedures can sometimes confuse in practise. It 
is common that BITs contain a selection of procedures, leaving it up to the 
disputing parties to decide on a particular one.42 The possibility of overlap 
became apparent with two cases involving SGS, a Swiss company. The 
disputes arose from similar pre-inspection agreements with Pakistan and the 
Philippines. SGS, the investor, alleged that these agreements had been 
unlawfully terminated or breached by both of the host states involved, so 
they initiated ICSID arbitration. The primary question for the tribunal was 
whether and to what extent contractual claims may be adjudicated by an 
ICSID tribunal, it was therefore important to differentiate between 
contractual claims and treaty claims.43 In SGS v. Pakistan an ICSID tribunal 
held that they lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate over contractual claims even 
if the BIT44 stipulated a broad interpretation regarding investments and 
disputes.45 This view was rejected in SGS v. Philippines where the ICSID 
tribunal said that they were able to adjudicate both in contractual claims and 
treaty claims in relation to a similar approach in the BIT regarding 
investments and disputes.46 The case of SGS v. Pakistan was however more 
complicated, SGS had already initiated domestic proceeding when resorting 
to the ICSID arbitration. The Swiss proceedings failed due to the sovereign 
immunity of Pakistan.47 Thus the Supreme Court of Pakistan issued an order 
restraining SGS to pursue ICSID arbitration and meant that the dispute was 
to be settled in accordance with the Pakistani Arbitrations Act as was 
provided for in the pre-shipment inspection agreement.48 This case is 
complicated and complex; it is a good example of the system as a whole 
since it shows both the possibility of resorting to different dispute settlement 
forums and the issues tribunals face when interpreting a BIT. 
 
It is likely that a dispute will have its closest connection to the host state 
since that is where the investment is made. Thus, it is likely that the 
domestic courts of the host state with its jurisdictional rules will be the 
appropriate forum for the dispute settlement of arisen investment disputes. 
This might lead to a number of consequences for the disputing parties. The 
courts of host countries may be avoided by express choice of forum in the 
agreements, either to a court in the home country or of a third state. 
However, there is always a risk that the court of a third state will dismiss the 
case due to sovereign immunity.49  
                                                 
42 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 692. 
43 Alexandrow, 2004, p. 556. 
44 Switzerland- Pakistan BIT. 
45 SGS v. Pakistan 
46 SGS v. Philippines under the Switzerland- Philippines BIT 
47 SGS v. Pakistan, Swiss federal Court.  
48 Pakistan v SGS, Supreme Court of Pakistan.  
49 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 696. 
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2.3.5 Consultations and Negotiations 
In most disputes that rise between a state and an investor the parties are 
obliged to start off with negotiations or consultations for a specified period 
of time before they can seek another remedy like arbitration.50 There is most 
often a confidentiality surrounding these kinds of consultations or 
negotiations and there is therefore not any good statistics concerning these 
settlements.51 It is possible to settle a case through negotiation even if 
arbitration has been initiated, and it is estimated that approximately 30% of 
all ICSID cases are settled through negotiation instead of arbitral awards.52 
In the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration about two 
thirds of all arbitration cases were settled through negotiation in 1995.53  
2.3.6 ICSID Convention 
2.3.6.1 ICSID Arbitration 
Due to the above shown issues with adjudication many BITs have evolved 
clear provisions on how disputes are to be settled. The ICSID convention is 
a common system to incorporate, as a way of settling disputes. To be able to 
use it both home and host states needs to be members of the convention. The 
ICSID convention provides a fixed set of rules with the support of an 
experienced arbitral institution, together with this it provides an autonomous 
and flexible system that is typically associated with the advantages of 
arbitration. However, ICSID does not consist of various arbitral tribunals, in 
fact what they do is to provide facilities for arbitration including keeping 
lists of possible arbitrators, assisting in the constitution of arbitral tribunals 
and the conduct of proceedings, screening and registering arbitral requests, 
adopting rules and regulations and drafting model clauses for investment 
agreements. Arbitration under the ICSID convention is not compulsory due 
to the fact that both disputing parties (home and host state) are contracting 
parties to the convention. Arbitration under ICSID only becomes binding 
after the written consent of both parties, either host state and home state or 
host state and investor.54 Once written consent has been given, either in an 
investment agreement or otherwise, it is not possible to unilaterally 
withdraw. The arbitral tribunals then have the exclusive competence to 
decide on its jurisdiction. After given consent the awards are binding and 
enforceable, and they may not be disregarded or challenged due to nullity 
unless it is under the convention’s own annulment rules. The possibility for 
unilateral impediments during proceedings is also foreclosed by the 
convention. It is safe to say that the convention does its very best to assure 
that the proceedings will continue even if co-operation from one party is 
lacking.55  
                                                 
50 Dugan an others, 2008, p.117. 
51 Salacuse, 2010, p. 364. 
52 Coe, 2005, p. 12f. 
53 Schwartz, 1995, p. 98f. 
54 The ICSID Convention, art 1, 6, 12, 18, 36 and 38. 
55 The ICSID Convention, art 1, 25, 38, 41, 45, 52, 53 and 54. 
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2.3.6.2 Requirements 
Not all disputes may exploit the benefits of the ICSID Convention. There 
are two requirements established in art 25 of the convention relating both to 
the nature of the dispute and to the parties of the dispute. The jurisdiction of 
the ICSID tribunals is limited to legal disputes arising directly out of an 
investment. The jurisdiction further covers contracting states and nationals 
of a contracting state.56 It is due to these requirements not possible for 
parties to utilise the ICSID arbitration if the dispute does not fulfil the entire 
requirements even if they expressly consent to it.57 To solve this issue an 
additional facility was created as a way of granting access under the 
Conventions arbitration even if the requirements are not fully met, explained 
in more detail in 2.3.6.5.58 
2.3.6.3 Final awards 
Article 54 of the Convention states that ICSID awards are final awards that 
are binding for the contracting States; therefore they have to be recognized 
in all contracting states as if they were final judgements of the domestic 
courts. In this way the ICSID arbitration is relatively secluded from 
interference and review by national courts.59 There are often big amounts of 
money at stake in an investor-state dispute, amounts that can put a strain on 
the host countries budgets or finances if they are to pay an award settled by 
arbitration. The highest award that has been settled was against the Czech 
Republic in 2003 and was for US$353 million.60 The risk of high awards 
makes host countries more reluctant at break provisions in investment 
agreements, making investing in the state more secure.61 ICSID provides for 
a special annulment procedure for their awards. An ICSID award may be set 
aside by an ad hoc committee if the tribunal was not properly constituted, 
the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers, there was corruption on the part 
of a member of the tribunal, there was a serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure, or the award failed to state the reasons on 
which it was based.62 There were discussions in 2004 and 2005 on 
introducing a true appellate system within ICSID, however today it appears 
unlikely that these plans will be made reality.63  
2.3.6.4 Conciliation 
It is not only arbitration that is available under the ICSID Convention, also 
conciliation is at hand, however not as frequently utilised. This is shown by 
the fact that by 2006 ICSID had received 192 requests for arbitration, but 
only four for conciliation.64 The two methods are not differentiated in the 
convention but only one at the time can be used in a dispute. It is therefore 
important that contracting parties specify whether arbitration or conciliation 
                                                 
56 The ICDID Convention, art 25.  
57 Schlemmer, 2008, p.  
58 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 700.  
59 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 700. 
60 CME v Czech Republic, 2003. 
61 Salacuse, 2010, p 355f. 
62 ICSID Convention art 52.  
63 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 701.  
64 ICSID webpage.  
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is the method applicable to upcoming disputes. It is however possible to 
resort to arbitration after failed attempts of conciliation.65 Conciliation is the 
lowest in the hierarchy of dispute settlement through the involvements of a 
third party, mostly because the settlement is not enforceable.66 
2.3.6.5 Additional Facility 
The last form of dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention is the 
previously mentioned additional facility. The additional facility was 
established in 1978 as a way of opening up the access to dispute settlement 
under the ICSID Convention. The following disputes that do not qualify for 
arbitration or conciliation may use the additional facility; firstly when only 
one side of the dispute is a party to or national to a party of the ICSID 
Convention, secondly when there is a dispute that does not directly arise out 
of an investment provided that at least one side of the dispute is a party to 
the convention, or a national to a party. Thirdly, fact-finding proceeding 
between a contracting state and a national of another state may be brought 
under the additional facility.67 If neither side of the dispute is a party to the 
ICSID Convention, then the additional facility is not applicable and the 
dispute needs to be settled by another institution, like UNCITRAL.68 
However, just like commercial disputes, it is possible to settle disputes both 
by institutional arbitration or ad hoc tribunals.69 
2.3.7 Advantages and disadvantages 
Arbitration under the ICSID Convention provides several advantages to 
investors and can be summarised as follows. Firstly is gives the investors 
the possibility of direct access to a form of dispute settlement in case of a 
dispute with a host state. It also extends the possibility of dispute settlement 
beyond the national courts. Another advantage for an investor is that they do 
not have to rely on diplomatic protection from their home state. Also the 
enforcement provisions in the ICSID Convention provide an advantage 
since it is likely that the awards will be effectively enforced.  Nonetheless 
the ICSID Convention is not only advantageous for the investor, it is also 
positive for the host state to adopt the ICSID convention. The legal security 
that ICSID provides for an investor attracts investments and creates a 
favourable investment climate in the host state. Using arbitration under the 
ICSID Convention also excludes the harassment potential of diplomatic 
protection that a home state of an investor might exercise against a host 
state.70  
 
When looking at diplomatic protection the advantages are not as many for 
the investor as with ICSID, instead there are several disadvantages. One 
disadvantage is that the investor relies entirely on the home states interest in 
                                                 
65 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 702. 
66 Sornarajah, 2000, p. 18.  
67 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 704.  
68 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 705.  
69 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 707. 
70 Reinisch and Malintoppi, 2008, p. 701.  
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helping out in the situation. If a home state decides to bring the claim, then 
they own it and the investor has nothing to say when it comes to the 
settlement. Another big disadvantage for investors when it comes to 
diplomatic protection is the home states lack of ability to extend its 
diplomatic protection to nationals who are shareholders in a foreign 
company.71 This was decided in the famous and criticised case of Barcelona 
Traction. The case, settled in the international court of justice stated that 
Belgium was not able to bring claims under diplomatic protection for 
Belgian shareholders in a Canadian company whose activities were 
prevented in Spain after an expropriation by the Spanish government. The 
court meant that the primary part injured was the Canadian company, not 
the Belgian shareholders.72 The decisions made through diplomatic 
protection are not as enforceable as ICSID arbitration. The decisions of 
diplomatic protection had yielded little concrete results in history and the 
injured party has not received monetary compensation. With diplomatic 
protection the investor is dependent on the home state to bring forward 
claims, and the home state may not find it necessary, leaving the investor 
incapable of receiving damages. The disadvantages with diplomatic 
protection for an investor versus the advantages of ICSID arbitration are one 
of the reasons that the making of BITs has increased enormously in the past 
20 years.73  
                                                 
71 Salacuse, 2010, p 359. 
72 Barcelona Traction, 1970. 
73 Salacuse, 2010, p 359. 
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3 Critisism on Investment 
Treaty Arbitration  
3.1 Introduction 
The system of investment treaty arbitration has been highly criticised by e.g. 
authors, professors and practitioners. The critique differs and is aimed at 
different aspects of the system. However, a lot of the criticism is raised due 
to the fact that the system of law differs in many ways, as explained above, 
from other areas of international law. It is unique that a private actor has the 
possibility to initiate arbitration against the government of a foreign state, 
and that the awards are highly enforceable. The next chapter of this thesis 
will elaborate on the criticism against the system. The focus of the criticism 
will be a book written by Gus van Harten in 2007 named Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Public Law. 
3.2 Information about the author 
The book Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law by Gus van Harten 
derives from his PhD thesis written between 2002 and 2006 at the London 
School of Economics. It is an analytical and institutional study of the system 
of investment treaty arbitration. The book contains a lot of critique, critique 
that I will elaborate on in this chapter. 
3.3 Overall attitude 
The last section of the first chapter van Harten states the following;  
 
“In this last regard, it should be emphasized that the target of 
criticism in this book is neither the global economy nor foreign 
investors nor the employment of international law and adjudication 
to strengthen the confidence of international business or resolve 
regulatory disputes involving the state. Rather, the target of 
criticism is the particular way in which states have used a private 
method of international adjudication to resolve claims that should 
be finally determined by courts, whether domestic or international. 
Consensual arbitration is broadly suitable as a means to settle 
disputes between companies or between states, but it is 
fundamentally inadequate as a substitute for the public courts in the 
regulatory domain. As I shall argue, the courts and only the courts 
should have the final authority to interpret the law that binds 
sovereign power and to stipulate the appropriate remedies for 
sovereign wrongs that lead to business loss.”74 
                                                 
74 Van Harten, 2007, p. 10. 
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This quote shows van Harten’s attitude against the whole system of 
investment treaty arbitration. 
 
Van Harten means that host governments and investors has chosen to use 
the model of private arbitration instead of that of a tenured judiciary, leaving 
it up to an arbitral tribunal to decide what legislature, public administration 
and courts may lawfully do in the exercise of regulatory powers. This way 
of settling disputes makes the system unlike any other within international 
law. The system is unique in the way that it is a method of public law 
adjudication, meaning that it is used to resolve regulatory disputes between 
individuals and states, as opposed to reciprocal disputes between equals, 
such as between states or between private actors. Investment treaty 
arbitration submits sovereign authority and budgets of state to formal 
control by adjudicators. Van Harten says that since the arbitrators are not 
tenured and only one class of parties can bring claims, they are suspected of 
interpreting investment treaties broadly as a way of expanding the systems 
appeal to potential claimants and, in a way, their own prospect of future 
appointment.75 This makes the system dependant on the fact that investors 
are pleased with the results of arbitration, making other investors interested 
in utilizing the system.76  
3.3.1 Summary of the critique 
The main issues that van Harten sees with the system today is: 
 
1. The courts should solve regulatory disputes that may affect the 
public. The arbitration process cannot fulfil core features of dispute 
settlement since it lacks in accountability, openness, coherence and 
independence. 
2. The way of settling disputes through investment treaty arbitration is 
unlike any other system of international law, the system gives a 
private actor a lot of power. 
3. Van Harten claims that there is a bias in favour of the investors. This 
due to the arbitrator’s lack of tenure, which makes them dependent 
on prospective claims, claims that only the investors can bring. 
4. The system can put a strain on host state economies due to its high 
awards and strong enforceability. It is also open for forum shopping.  
3.4 Essential characteristics 
The system of investment treaty arbitration has several essential 
characteristics according to van Harten. The first one is that the arbitrators 
have a wide-ranging jurisdiction to review sovereign acts by interpreting 
investment treaties making them empowered to resolve core matters of 
public law. Secondly, investment treaties use the enforcement structure of 
                                                 
75 Van Harten, 2007, preface. 
76 Van Harten, 2007, p. 4. 
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the ICSID convention and the New York convention making the awards of 
arbitrators more widely enforceable than other adjudicative decisions in 
public law. The third characteristic is that the laws of many investment-
exporting countries were revised in the 1980s and 1990s to direct domestic 
courts to defer to foreign arbitration awards. The result of this according to 
van Harten is that arbitrators can interpret and apply public law with limited 
court supervision. The last and fourth is that the arbitrators have the power 
to award damages as a public law remedy without applying various 
limitations on state liability that has evolved in domestic legal systems as a 
way of balancing the objectives of deterrence and compensation against the 
opposite principles of democratic choice and governmental discretion. All of 
the four characteristics enable arbitrators to settle on the legality of 
sovereign acts and to award public funds to businesses that has sustained a 
loss as a result of governmental regulations. Van Harten says that this 
undermines the basic hallmarks of judicial accountability, openness and 
independence. Van Harten means that it is a step backwards using 
arbitrators to settle investment disputes instead of tenured judges in national 
courts.77 
3.5 Forum shopping and high awards 
It is further argued in the book that the awards from investment treaty 
arbitration can put an enormous strain on the host states economy. Van 
Harten highlights the case of CME v. Czech Republic where the Czech 
Republic was ordered to pay US$353 million to an investor that owned a 
Czech broadcasting business, a sum roughly equal to the whole health-care 
budget of the country. The effected investor was a Dutch company, CME 
Czech Republic, which was in turn owned by Ralph Lauder, an American 
billionaire. The tribunal ordered the Czech Republic to pay damaged to 
CME for violating the Czech Republic- Netherlands BIT by issuing 
regulatory advice that prompted CME to divest itself of a popular TV 
station.78 Van Harten argues that this case is important for two reasons, first 
is the huge amount of money putting a strain on the Czech Republic. The 
second issue with the case is that just ten days before the award was issued a 
parallel claim by Mr Lauder based on the same case against the Czech 
Republic was dismissed by a separate tribunal. The dismissed case was 
initiated six months earlier under the Czech-United states BIT. The tribunal 
in the dismissed case found that no violation had been done since they:  
 
“did not see any inconsistent conduct on the part of the Media 
Counsel which would amount to an unfair and inequitable 
treatment.”79 
 
                                                 
77 Van Harten, 2007, p. 4f. 
78 CME v. Czech Republic, 2001. 
79 Lauder (Ronald S) v Czech Republic. 
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Thus, two conflicting decisions were issued under the same dispute under 
similarly worded BITs. Mr Lauder lost his personal claim based on the 
argument that the breach by the Czech Republic was: 
 
“too remote to qualify as a relevant cause for the harm.”80  
 
However, Mr Lauder through his Dutch holding company could collect 
damages. Van Harten argues that this opens up for forum shopping and 
shows the systems lack of coherence. Investors can now trigger the 
compulsory investment treaty arbitration, leaving them stronger than any 
other private actor in dispute settlement under international law.81 Van 
Harten means that the system only protects one class of individuals by 
constraining the government that continue to represent everyone else.  
 
“Designed this way, the system disadvantages those individuals 
who stand to benefit from business regulations that is now 
foreclosed by investment treaties or from other public initiatives, 
the cost of which is made too high or uncertain by threat of 
investor claims.”82  
3.6 Ambiguity and uncertainty 
There in an ambiguity to several terms incorporated into BITs, such as 
investment, discrimination, fair treatment and expropriations, the ambiguity 
gives them a wide authority in public law. Because of this ambiguity 
investment treaties authorize arbitrators to scrutinize virtually any sovereign 
act of the state that may affect a foreign investors asset according to van 
Harten. It is uncertain if investors by filing claims can compel states to pay 
compensation for regulatory measures that do not specifically target a 
foreign investment for abuse or discrimination.83 
 
In the current system individuals are awarded damages for sovereign 
wrongs, which raises tricky issues about the scope and purpose of state 
liability and the appropriate role of government. The question that van 
Harten raises due to this fact is whether damages should be awarded to 
compensate individuals, or to deter inappropriate state conduct. He also 
wonders if liability should be limited by requirements of malice or fault on 
the part of the state or even in light of the need to uphold flexibility and 
predictability in government? Another question raised is if legislative or 
judicial acts should be exempt from liability. Van Harten explains that these 
questions previously have been resolved by domestic public law. Today 
under the system of investment treaty arbitration these questions are brought 
within the discretion of arbitrators and therefore kept confidential in many 
                                                 
80 Lauder (Ronald S) v Czech Republic. 
81 Van Harten, 2007, p. 7f. 
82 Van Harten, 2007, p. 10. 
83 Van Harten, 2007, p. 93f. 
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cases. Thus, approaches to state liability has become more relevant to 
international adjudication.84 
 
Van Harten further criticises that many investment treaty arbitrators 
approach the system as a slightly modified form of commercial arbitration. 
He argues that investors and states are treated as equal disputing parties in a 
reciprocally consensual adjudication. By doing this, interpretation should be 
based on the intent of the disputing parties, not of the state parties. This 
system changes investment treaty arbitration into a regime governing the 
public sphere by private law rules or rights-based norm; this results in a 
skewed system in favour of business and against other individuals and the 
community as a whole.85 
3.7 Key aspects 
There are four key aspects of public law adjudication according to van 
Harten, accountability, openness, coherence and independence. Since 
investment treaty arbitration not only affects the parties involved but also 
the public and since the awards are highly enforceable the system of 
investment treaty arbitration is a form of public law adjudication. 
Investment treaty arbitration lacks in all four key aspects according to van 
Harten.  
3.7.1 Accountability 
With accountability the system is lacking due to the fact that arbitrators can 
interpret public law without the possibility of a judge reviewing their 
decisions for errors of law. Accountability is a broad concept that can 
include different checks and restraints on judicial powers. Is has been 
criticised that many arbitrators lack in their competence when it comes to 
investment treaty arbitration since their background is in commercial law. It 
is hard in the current system to appeal an award even if it is considered to be 
wrong, therefore the accountability is lacking. Van Harten argues:  
 
“this lack of judicial supervision renders the arbitrator’s 
interpretation of public law- itself a fundamentally sovereign act- 
unaccountable in the conventional sense.”86 
 
To be able to understand this fully it is helpful to look at how arbitration 
awards are enforced by domestic courts pursuant to the New York 
convention according to van Harten. It is important to distinguish the 
jurisdictional seat of arbitration from the place of enforcement, since courts 
in both locations can review the arbitrational awards. The seat of arbitration 
is the place where the arbitral tribunal is located for purposes of domestic 
jurisdiction. According to the New York convention, arbitration is subject to 
                                                 
84 Van Harten, 2007, p. 107. (with further information in van Hartens footnotes) 
85 Van Harten, 2007, p. 124f. 
86 Van Harten, 2007, p. 154. 
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supervision by domestic courts at the seat of arbitration. A respondent state 
may only apply to set aside an award in the courts of the arbitrational seat 
based on its domestic law. It is therefore the domestic law of the 
arbitrational seat that determines the level of supervision available for a 
court to exercise over an arbitration tribunal. Hence, by selecting the seat of 
arbitration, arbitrators ultimately decides whether investment treaty 
arbitration constitutes an extra-territorial arrangement by which sovereign 
behaviour of one state is subject to review by a tribunal established in the 
jurisdiction of a foreign state, a state that can be the home state of the 
investor.87 
 
The place of enforcement is the location where the investor seeks to enforce 
an award against the assets of the respondent state.88 It is possible for a court 
at the place of enforcement to refuse to enforce an award based on the 
limited grounds established in the New York Convention. It is also possible 
to enforce an award even where the award has been set aside in the seat of 
arbitration, then again that is not very likely.89 However, it is feasible for an 
investor to seek enforcement of an award against the assets of the 
respondent in any court of a state party to the New York Convention, 
regardless of whether the courts of either the respondent state itself or the 
place of arbitration has upheld the awards. This makes the awards highly 
enforceable for an investor.90 
 
The wide prospects of seeking enforcement restrict judicial supervision of 
arbitrators according to van Harten. This due to the possibility for investors 
to pursue the enforcement of awards in any state that is party to the New 
York convention, dividing supervisory responsibility among the courts of 
many different countries. He means that:  
 
“judicial supervision is restricted because the enforcement 
structure limits the setting aside or non-recognition of awards to 
the narrow grounds enumerated in the New York convention and 
relevant domestic legislation. In international commercial 
arbitration, this restriction on judicial supervision is justifiable on 
the basis that the courts should not interfere with the choices of 
private parties to resolve commercial disputed in a forum of their 
choosing. Under investment treaties, though, the structure operates 
to insulate the authority of arbitrators to interpret public law.”91  
 
The possibility to choose jurisdiction gives the investors possibilities to pick 
the one most likely to defer to and enforce the award. There are states that 
have adopted liberal enforcement rules for foreign investments as a way of 
                                                 
87 Van Harten, 2007, p. 155f. 
88 Van Harten, 2007, p. 156f. 
89 The New York Convention. 
90 Van Harten, 2007, p. 157. 
91 Van Harten, 2007, p. 158. 
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attracting arbitration in the state; one result of this is reduced court 
supervision.92 
3.7.2 Coherence 
When it comes to coherence van Harten argues that the lack of an appellate 
body who can review awards, makes it difficult to unify the jurisprudence 
into a secure system of state liability. The issues arise from the systems 
fragmented and individualised structure, and especially from the non-
existence of an appellate institution. To get coherence it needs to exist an 
appellate body with jurisdiction to review awards issued by different 
tribunals under divers BITs and to correct errors of law made in the first 
instance. Since there are so many different BITs interpreted by various 
tribunals it is inevitable that core standards and concepts will be interpreted 
in distinct ways. Supervision of tribunals is made by domestic courts or by 
the ICSID annulment process. This is a way of increasing coherence, 
however, different courts in various states, makes it hard to attain more 
complete coherence as one does with one single appellate institution 
performing the supervision. Coherence is not only an issue for investment 
treaty arbitration; it is also a problem for commercial arbitration. One of the 
greatest challenges for domestic and national courts is to interpret the law in 
flexible yet predictable ways; thus, coherence is an issue at both court and in 
arbitration. Then again, the courts have had many years of practise in the 
area. However, coherence is not a unique issue for investment treaty 
arbitration.93 
3.7.3 Openness 
The aspect of openness if not fulfilled since a big amount of cases is settled 
without public knowledge and observation. The general editor of van 
Hartens book sets in the preface that the criterion of transparency and 
openness within dispute settlement is not sufficient in the system of 
investment treaty arbitration, this due to the fact that tribunals are deciding 
on questions of great importance to the public order of states. The issues 
with transparency can be shown by the fact that ICSID is the only 
international forum settling investment claims that is required to publicise 
them. Other arbitral tribunals established under e.g. the UNCITRAL rules 
allow for claims to be kept confidential, unless both parties agree otherwise, 
in the tradition of commercial arbitration. Transparency is a fundamental 
cornerstone in the rule of law and the lack of it is therefore a problem. 
Because of the confidentiality in claims, it is not possible to know for 
certain the extent of investment treaty arbitration. However, the increase in 
ICSID claims is a strong indicator of the system as a whole.94   
 
The investors and the disputing governments appoint the members of the 
arbitral tribunals. This makes the proceedings, or even the existence of the 
                                                 
92 Van Harten, 2007, p. 158.  
93 Van Harten, 2007, p. 164f. 
94 Van Harten, 2007, p. 30f. 
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tribunals, private, giving little or no opportunity for public comment upon or 
scrutiny of the proceedings.95 It is not possible for the arbitrators to hear the 
views of non-parties that might get affected by the dispute. Public access to 
information relating to judicial decision-making in domestic and 
international courts is a fundamental principle of law. It is essential that 
adjudication takes place in the public eye, subject to certain exceptions, and 
that judicial decisions together with relevant documents filed in litigation be 
placed in the public record, so that the public can access it. This is essential 
due to the fact that if the information was not public there would be no 
possibility for public scrutiny and matters affecting the society could be 
decided in secret. Openness is therefore a precondition for both 
accountability and independence in adjudication.96 
 
Openness is a fundamental principle for decisions in courts; however, 
confidentiality is one of the selling points for commercial arbitration. Van 
Harten finds the confidentiality in commercial arbitration very different 
from confidentiality within investment treaty arbitration. In commercial 
arbitration it is only the parties or overwhelmingly only the parties that will 
be affected by the award. However with investment treaty arbitration the 
award might affect the state as a whole, i.e. the population of the state. 
Investment treaty arbitration allows the meaning of public law to be 
determined in secret by arbitral tribunals.97 The New York Times has 
reported on NAFTA arbitration stating the following:  
 
“Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown. 
The decisions they reach need not fully be disclosed. Yet the way a 
small group of international tribunals handles disputes between 
investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being 
revoked, justice systems questioned and environmental regulations 
challenged. And it is all in the name of protecting the rights of 
foreign investors…”98 
 
A large proportion of awards are settled under ICSID, making them publicly 
available. However, there is a possibility for investors and respondent states 
to initiate a completely confidential arbitration, maybe even confidential 
enough that no one even knows about the arbitration at all.99 In 2002 the 
NAFTA states intervened and stated that they will publish all documents 
submitted to, or issued by NAFTA tribunals. They also said that they 
interpreted the treaty such that it does not prevent them from publishing 
material relating to claims involving them. By doing this the states put 
openness ahead of party autonomy regarding rules of arbitration. NAFTA is 
developing in the right direction, opening up for public scrutiny making the 
principle of openness more present. The US has incorporated more openness 
by allowing publication of documents relating to investment treaty 
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arbitration in new BITS. However, confidentiality still dominates within 
investment treaty arbitration, and the European countries have a lot to learn 
from the US.100 
3.7.4 Independence 
Van Harten finds the lack of independence in the system the most troubling 
of them all. He means that the lack of independence is reflected in all of the 
above-discussed key aspect of investment treaty arbitration.  As mentioned, 
it is argued that arbitrators have a financial stake in arbitration making the 
system of investment treaty arbitration dependant on investors bringing 
claims. Since the arbitrators are not tenured judges they lack the security it 
brings, making them dependent on prospective claims. Judges are 
independent in the way that they are appointed for a set term of office and 
assured a fixed income regardless of how they perform and decide in 
different cases. The longer a judge’s term of tenure is, the less anxiety he or 
she will have concerning future employment. No judge or court is entirely 
independent; society and things surrounding it will always influence. 
However, the courts are the closest things we have to independence 
according to van Harten.101 Arbitrators lack the security that judges possess 
due to tenure since they are appointed on a case-by-case basis. Arbitrators 
are appointed by either the disputing parties or by an external authority, e.g. 
ICSID.  
 
Van Harten says that it is okay to use a dependent system in commercial 
disputes since both parties agree to this on equal basis. However, in 
investment treaty arbitration it is only the investor that can bring a claim. 
This undermines the judicial independence by foreclosing security of tenure. 
Consequently arbitrators are made dependent on prospective claimants and 
executive officials for their future appointment. The dependence on 
prospective claimants is pretty clear. Van Harten asserts that since it is only 
the investor that can bring claims, it is tempting for arbitrators to decide in 
their favour, making the system of investment treaty arbitration more 
appealing for other investors, increasing the likelihood of future 
appointment for the arbitrator. When it comes to executive officials van 
Harten argues that the dependence arises when organisations designed to 
appoint arbitrators in disputes are utilised by the disputing parties. Then it is 
essential for arbitrators to be of interest for the executive official appointed 
to elect arbitrators. The leading organisation in appointing arbitrators is 
ICSID, established under the World Bank. The president of the Word Bank 
is nominated by the US government and confirmed by the Bank’s Board of 
Directors, who is by convention a US national. Van Harten argues that this 
will make the appointed arbitrators more akin to decide in favour of the 
investors, who is typically from an investment exporting country, since they 
do not want to upset the states that directly and indirectly is involved in their 
appointment.102 The system is tainted by an apprehension of bias in favour 
                                                 
100 Van Harten, 2007, p. 162f. 
101 Van Harten, 2007, p. 168.  
102 Van Harten, 2007, p. 170f.  
 27 
of allowing claims and awarding damages against governments according to 
van Harten.103  
3.8 Options for reform 
Van Harten argues that it is the system as a whole that is inadequate in 
solving investment treaty disputes. It cannot be fixed by appointing different 
persons through ICSID or other institutions. Restructuring the whole 
concept of investment treaty arbitration can only solve the issues. There is a 
need to reinstate the model of public courts into investment treaty dispute 
settlement. Van Harten suggests both a solution with domestic courts and 
one with an international court. He suggests that strong investment 
exporting countries, many of them in Europe follow the path that the US has 
taken with more openness creating more coherence and accountability.104 
This thesis will not elaborate further on van Harten’s options for reforms 
since they are mere ideas not currently effective.  
3.9 Later critique 
Van Harten has kept criticising the system of investment treaties. This thesis 
will look at some of his critique written after the publication of his book.  
 
In 2008, one year after the book was released he wrote a short commentary 
on the establishment of an international investment court. Here he highlights 
many of the issues raised in the book, however with more focus on the lack 
of need to exhaust local remedies before bringing investment arbitration 
claim. He suggests that an international investment court is the best way for 
solving the current issues with investment treaty arbitration. 105 
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4 In defence of the system of 
investment treaty arbitration 
4.1 Introduction 
Not everyone criticises investment treaty arbitration, there are a lot of 
people in favour of the system. There is also book reviews on van Harten’s 
book criticising parts of it. This chapter will elaborate on three articles.  
4.2 Defence by Daniel Meyer 
Daniel Meyers wrote an article in 2008 in defence of the investment treaty 
arbitration system. The article is especially focused on justification against 
the critique made by Gus van Harten in the above-described book.106 
Meyers means that certain aspects of Van Harten’s critique are warranted; 
however his conclusions, both implicit and explicit are overdramatic. He 
further says that a modest infusion of accountability, openness, coherence 
and independence would ameliorate the system. Van Harten’s suggestions 
on a new system would help with this. Nonetheless the system would work 
fine without these changes. Meyers means that the necessary changes can be 
accomplished gradually over time into the current system.107 
 
To fully understand today’s system Meyer means that it is important to 
know the history of it. ITA, as he abbreviates investment treaty arbitration, 
developed as a more secure way for investors to settle disputes than 
diplomatic protection. It was considered that foreign investments would 
increase the economic development in the world, making investment-
importing states stronger economically. With diplomatic protection the 
investors were not certain that they would be able to receive compensation 
in case of host-state misconduct harming the investment. The uncertainty 
might scare off investors, resulting in less economic development, therefore 
there was a need for a safer investment protection.  
 
Today it is not shown that the ITA has had the result of increased economic 
development in investment-importing states. However it is shown that it has 
not decreased it.108 He also highlights that it might not be possible to see the 
full effects of the system since it was only in the late 90´s that it really 
bloomed. He means that it is important to keep in mind why the system was 
created in the first place when looking at what it has developed into. 109 
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4.2.1 The ITA system as a system of Public Law 
Adjudication 
Van Harten means that the ITA system is a public law system since the 
awards can regulate governmental conduct. Public law has traditionally been 
settled in the states legal system. ITA has radically changed this by allowing 
investors to bring claims directly against a state under arbitration, not at 
court. Since ITA has taken the role that domestic legal systems had before, 
they need to fulfil the four key aspects of public law adjudication according 
to van Harten, accountability, openness, coherence and independence.110 
 
Meyer states that it would not be smart for arbitrators to favour decisions 
that interpret BITs broadly and thus conciliate investors, since it would 
jeopardize the long-term survival of the system. In this way it is in the 
arbitrators best interest to maintain objective and resolve upcoming disputes 
in a neutral manner. Meyer also contests the critique made by van Harten of 
that arbitrators are biased in favour of investors since there is no empirical 
evidence of this. If arbitrators were overall biased it would show as a trend 
in the arbitral awards. Van Harten criticises the lack of coherence in ITA, 
something that Mayer see as evidence of the fact that arbitrators are not 
biased, if there is no coherence between arbitrators, how can there then be a 
common bias in favour of investors? Meyer claims that it is very 
questionable of van Harten to want to fundamentally alter a system that 
works a whole lot better than the previous one, based on a fear of perceived 
bias.111  
 
In his conclusion Meyer states that the ITA system is a very young one that 
was developed in a short period of time. Because of this it consists of 
several flaws. It is therefore important with critique so that the system can 
ameliorate. However, the critique can be dangerous if it has lost sight of the 
historical background. Today investors are independent from the interests of 
their home state and have the possibility to bring their own claims against a 
state that has injured its investments. The ITA system is not perfect, but 
Meyer argues that the system is not flawed to such an extent that it has to be 
changed fundamentally. To remove the ITA system would make investors 
more vulnerable, making them less inclined to invest in foreign states. This 
would ultimately put a strain on the economic development that foreign 
investments have created. Conclusively Meyer means the ITA system is 
flawed, however it fulfils the needs it was developed for, nevertheless it 
need improvement to achieve its full potential.112 
4.2.2 Conclusion 
Meyers meets van Hartens critique mainly by referring to the historical 
background of the system. He does agree with van Harten that the system is 
not perfect, however he means that van Hartens critique is exaggerated and 
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lacks empirical support, however he does not provide any empirical support 
for his own opinions. Meyers means that the system is very young and that 
it is still developing.  
4.3 Book reveiws 
José Alvarez wrote a book review on van Hartens book in October 2008. He 
both compliments and criticises van Harten. Alvarez means that van Hartens 
book suffers from numerous flaws. He argues that van Harten’s divide of 
critique between what he calls investors-state arbitration and investment 
treaty arbitration is illegitimate. Van Harten means that arbitration that rises 
out of a contractual relationship where the state can decide on a case-by-
case basis if it agrees to arbitration is acceptable. However, ITA is not 
acceptable since it makes the states obliged to utilise arbitration in any 
dispute that may rise between a state and an investor, making it more 
feasible for disputes affecting the public to be resolved by arbitration. 
Alvarez argues that van Harten does not provide enough argument for this 
divide in arbitration. He means that it is very possible that the disputes that 
have been settled under ITA would also be settled thought arbitration in a 
more contractual relationship.113 Alvarez critiques van Hartens lack of 
explanation when it comes to the two forms of arbitration, he argues that 
van Harten give little explanation as to why these forms are so different to 
him.114 
 
Alvarez, just as Meyer, critiques van Harten’s lack of evidence in support of 
his alleged bias in favour of investors under arbitration. The author means 
that van Harten has no support in awards that show the claimed bias.115 
 
Alvarez further considers van Harten to be failing in his reasoning over why 
states have resisted proposals for an appellate investment mechanism. 
According to Alvarez the majority of states appear to fear that a permanent 
group of appellate judges would cost more than arbitration and cause delay, 
many also fear that the judges would feel more empowered than ad hoc 
arbitrators to evolve principles of international investment law. The judges 
might prove more capable of developing more constant jurisprudence. 
Conclusively Alvarez means that van Harten has focused on a very narrow 
scope of the system and in doing so:  
 
“he may be barking up the wrong tree, ignoring a huge forest 
behind.”116 
 
Also Scott Shackelford wrote a book review on van Harten’s book in 2008. 
His reasoning regarding it is similar to Meyer and Alvarez, and he both 
compliments it and gives it critique.117 
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4.3.1 Conclusion 
Alvarez argues that van Harten does not provide enough evidence and 
arguments for many of his conclusions. He means that van Harten might be 
focusing on the wrong thing missing out on other core facts. Nor Alvarez 
has provided for empirical fact as a basis for his arguments, therefore it is 
word against word and it is up to the reader to form an opinion of their own 
regarding the system and its flaws.  
4.4 Empirical evaluation of the system 
Meyers, Alvarez and Shackelford has criticised van Harten for not providing 
enough evidence in support of his claimed bias in favour of investors. They 
mean that van Harten should have demonstrated support of this claim in 
arbitral awards.  
4.4.1 Empirically evaluating claims about Investment 
Treaty Arbitration 
Susan Franck has performed empirical studies of awards as a way of 
evaluating investment treaty arbitration claims. Franck means that empirical 
studies can offer valuable insight on issues of international importance, such 
as investment treaty dispute settlement. In her study, Franck has explored in 
each award (1) who is involved in arbitration and what is arbitrated, (2) 
increase in awards, (3) win/loss rates, (4) amounts claimed and awarded, (5) 
arbitration cost, (6) use of other dispute resolution processes, and (7) 
nationality and gender of the arbitrators. Franck considers that the answers 
of these questions will contribute to future research and provide her with 
enough information to evaluate claims made about the investment treaty 
arbitration.118 Franck argues that empirical analysis can provide critical 
information to aid effective conflict management, reduce investment risk 
and promote international development. She means that an increased 
emphasis on empirical dimensions in this area will not solve the problems; 
nonetheless it may offer an opportunity to make more informed policy 
choices.119 
 
Franck’s study starts of with a quote, a quote in support of her work, it 
states:  
“For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the 
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics 
and the master of economics.”120  
 
Through her empirical study Franck found that some of the claims made 
against investment treaty arbitration was correct and some were erroneous. 
It was correct that the number of awards have increased in the past years, it 
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was also right that arbitration can be very costly, that there where a small 
number of settlements and that only a small number of arbitrators were 
women. However, several claims made against the system where flawed 
according to Franck’s study. Developing countries were not the only 
respondents; there were a large portion of claims against OECD countries 
and barely any claims against the least developed countries. Another 
conclusion that Franck could make out of the study is that investors did not 
win more disputes than governments and the tribunals did not generally 
award large damages. She also concluded that there were a relatively large 
number of active arbitrators, but only a few of them had repeat 
appointments.121  
4.4.2 Development and outcome of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration 
In 2009 Franck published another article based on empirical study of ITA 
awards. This time she wanted to answer three questions by statistical 
analysis. If (1) the arbitration process inappropriately favours the developed 
or the developing world, (2) arbitrators from the developed or the 
developing world exert undue influence on the process, or (3) these factors 
apply in combination.  
 
Franck found that presiding arbitrators122 came from both developed and 
developing countries, however most were from developing countries. She 
also found that there is a lack of a statistically significant relationship 
between development status and the ultimate winners of investment 
arbitration. There is also a lack of statistically significant relationship 
between the amounts awarded and development status of the respondent, the 
development status of presiding arbitrators, or even an interaction between 
those two variables. In general, development variables do not 
inappropriately affect the outcome of investment arbitration.123 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
Some of the conclusions that Franck has been able to draw from her 
empirical analysis deny critique made by van Harten. According to the 
studies van Harten was correct when he claimed that the arbitration could be 
very costly for the parties. However, Franck also found that the tribunals 
rarely award large damages. So the fear of putting an enormous strain on 
prospective respondents economy is somewhat drastic since most tribunal’s 
awards smaller amounts of damages, amounts that does not put a huge strain 
on states. Furthermore, the fact that it is not only developing countries that 
are respondents makes van Harten’s arguments less sustainable. A lot of his 
critique is against a system where the investors comes from strong capital 
exporting countries whereas the respondents are developing countries with 
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weak economies where a obligation to pay damages can put a strain on the 
economy of the state. Since a lot of the respondents are OECD countries 
with strong economies his generalized critique looses some support. All 
states can be subject to investment treaty arbitration as a respondent.  
 
One of van Harten’s most conspicuous claims where that arbitrators are 
biased in favour of investors when settling an award. The fact that investors 
did not win more awards than governments makes this claim rather weak. 
As Alvarez argues above, if the claimed bias where such a threat to the 
system then it would show in the awards. By looking at Franck’s study one 
can see that such bias is not particularity likely since the governments has 
won an equal amount of awards as the investors. 
 
 34 
5 Van Hartens critique on the 
defence and empirical study 
5.1 Critique on the defence 
Gus van Harten has written articles criticising the results of the empirical 
studies in 2010 and 2011. In the 2010 article published in Investment treaty 
news, professor van Harten comments on Franck’s study from 2009.  
 
Van Harten argues that many empirical studies do not examine specific 
hypothesis of bias or position the study in terms of literature on institutional 
aspects of adjudicative independence. He considers the studies to face 
serious methodological constraints and depend on assumptions that heavily 
qualify results. He means that the study does not take into account diversity 
of fact situations, varying experience levels and incentives among arbitrators 
and altering political influences of states and private actors.  
 
Van Harten means that Franck has made exaggerated or misplaced 
assumptions in the study. He also argues that Franck has misclassified 
several countries as developing when they should have been classified as 
developed-to-transition countries. He means that her results would become 
significantly different with the alternative classification. He further states 
that Franck lacks data to be able to draw the conclusions that she has made. 
The fact that the investment treaty arbitration system is highly confidential, 
with the exception of ICSID, makes it hard to collect the needed data for 
statistical analyses, resulting in difficulties in performing such studies.124 
 
Van Harten considers empirical studies to be great contributors to scholarly 
understanding of investment arbitration, however he means that it has 
important limitations in its ability to demonstrate the presence of absence of 
actual bias, even at a systemic level, thus reinforcing the need for 
institutional safeguards.125  
5.2 Conclusion 
Both van Harten and the other authors criticising him, all claim that the 
counterpart lacks support in their assumptions. Their standpoints are from 
two completely different directions, which makes them very defensive of 
their own view. They are almost as distant in their opinions as a vegetarian 
and a carnivore. It is hard at this stage to say who is wrong and who is right, 
it is mostly arguments that has to be seen though the eyes of the beholder. 
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6 Argentina – A Case Study 
6.1 Introduction  
To be able to evaluate the differing critique made by the various authors 
above, this thesis will conduct a case study. The case study will look at and 
analyse publicly available cases involving Argentina. Argentina is the one 
country involved in most investment treaty arbitration cases due to its severe 
financial crisis in the late 1990s. As a way of managing the crisis Argentina 
restructured the public utility system, eliminated the parity between the US 
dollar and the Argentine peso, and stopped the pegging of tariffs in 
government contracts to inflation-adjusted dollars. The pegging of the peso 
to the dollar had crippled the argentine exporters against their foreign 
competitors. When removing the pegged parity it disadvantaged foreign 
investors who had mostly invested in the public service sector in the 
early1990’s when Argentina privatized extensively.126 Many of the investors 
held US dollar denominated debts and were forced to collect tariffs from 
customers in a devalued Argentine peso.  
 
From mid 2001, US$20 billion was moved out of Argentina due to 
speculations of a devaluation of the peso. The speculations were right, in 
late November the reserves of the central bank in Argentina fell by US$2 
billion in one single day amidst massive capital flight. In a response to this, 
the Argentinean government froze bank accounts and imposed wage and 
capital controls. This in turn led to a blocked release of US$2 billion to 
Argentina from the International Monetary Fund, since they meant that the 
government had failed to impose austerity measures and other reforms. All 
this sent the Argentinean economy into a free-fall. A lot of jobs disappeared 
since huge amount of businesses went bankrupt. The wages of government 
workers were cut by 40% and US$3 billion in private pensions were 
redirected to service the national debt. The inhabitants of Argentina were 
furious and lots of street protests occurred at the time. During two weeks in 
December five presidents were forced from office.127  
 
The governments actions during the crisis also enraged many investors who 
considered certain acts to be a breach by Argentina of their treaty 
obligations and initiated dispute settlement through arbitration. Argentina 
claims that they did what they did as an emergency in a state of necessity 
due to the belief that the very existence of the Argentine Republic was 
threatened by the financial crisis. Argentina argues that emergency or 
necessity should exclude them from state liability due to both treaty 
regulations and international customary law. Over 50 cases have been 
initiated and a lot of them are still pending.128 
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By studying Argentina, hopefully one can look at the critique and appraise 
against the investment treaty arbitration system with new objective eyes. 
Analysing a country in financial crisis will give indications on how well the 
system will work when the world economics is not functioning very well. 
Hopefully it will give an insight in how it may look in a few years time, 
when the global financial crisis is over, especially with focus on countries 
such as Greece.  
 
A lot of the critique made by van Harten can be evaluated by empirical 
facts. This thesis will conduct a study, both statistically and with focus on 
certain cases and analyse this as a response to the above-discussed critique 
and praise.  
6.2 Forum shopping  
One of the issues raised by van Harten is that there is a problem with forum 
shopping. This thesis will examine if the problem has occurred in any of the 
cases concerning Argentina.  
 
There is no case of forum shopping regarding Argentina as obvious as the 
CME case against the Czech republic discussed by van Harten. Regarding 
Argentina there are a few corporations that are involved in more than one 
case. One is Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona (Suez), they are 
involved in two cases together with other enterprises that they co-own 
shares with in Argentinean companies. Both of the cases are based on the 
Spain-Argentina bit when relying on consent for arbitration. Since it is the 
same bit in both cases there is no issue with forum shopping. Both cases 
involving Suez are still pending.129 
 
Another company involved in two cases are Camuzzi International S.A. 
Camuzzi is a company incorporated under the Belgium-Luxemburg bit and 
both cases uses the Belgium-Luxemburg –Argentina BIT. Therefore neither 
here is there an issue with forum shopping. One of the cases is suspended at 
the request of the parties and still pending, the other one is concluded after 
that a settlement by the parties has been agreed and the proceeding has been 
discontinued at their request.130 
 
A third company involved in two cases is Vivendi Universal S.A. Both of 
the cases is basing its jurisdiction on the France-Argentina BIT, so nor here 
is there forum shopping.131 Lastly Azurix is involved in two cases, and also 
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here the jurisdiction is based on the same BIT, the US-Argentina one, 
leaving it free from forum shopping.132 
 
The scope of this thesis is not wide enough to examine the ownership of all 
companies involved in investment treaty arbitration with Argentina. It is 
therefore hard to say for certain that no forum shopping has occurred, 
however, the indication is that forum shopping is not a big issue. So by 
looking at Argentina one cannot find any proof of forum shopping, 
however, one must always remember that looking at Argentina may only 
give an indication of how the system works as a whole. Nonetheless, it is a 
hint of the fact that forum shopping might not be highly widespread when it 
comes to investment treaty arbitration.  
6.3 High awards 
High awards are another issue raised by van Harten. To examine this 
statement three questions will be discussed. (1) What are the highest and the 
lowest award rendered? (2) How many awards have been rendered and how 
many cases are there in total? (3) What is the average amount received in 
damages for investors.  
 
(1) The highest award that has been rendered against Argentina, at least the 
highest public one is in the case of Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic and 
it awarded Siemens with damages for US$208.4 million. It was an ICSID 
case on an informatic services contract with the German-Argentina BIT as 
the ground for jurisdiction. The case is now concluded, but both annulment- 
and revision proceedings have taken place after the rendered award in 
February 2007 by the original arbitral tribunal.133 
 
The lowest award rendered was in the case Continental Casualty Company 
v. Argentine Republic and it was for $2.8 million. This case is also 
concluded after annulment proceedings that dismissed the application on 
annulment by Argentina. Continental Casualty Company is an insurance 
company with its owners in the U.S.. Continental Casualty Company 
claimed that Argentina had enacted a series of decrees and resolutions that 
destroyed the legal security of the assets held by the company. These 
measures frustrated its ability to hedge against the risk of the devaluation of 
the peso. They claimed US$ 46.4 million in damages. The tribunal rejected 
all but one of the claims, therefore the rendered damages was a lot lower 
than claimed.134 
 
(2) All in all thirteen official awards rewarding damages have been rendered 
in cases against Argentina. 
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1. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No 
Arb/01/8, concluded. Award in favour of the claimant for $133.2m was 
rendered on 12 May 2005. Annulment proceedings rejecting the application 
were concluded 25 September 2007. 
 
2. Azurix v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No Arb/01/12, concluded. 
Award in favour of the claimant for $165.2m was rendered on 14 July 2006. 
Annulment proceedings rejecting the application were concluded 1 
September 2009.  
 
3. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/02/8, 
concluded. Award in favour of the claimant for $208.7m was rendered on 6 
February 2007. Annulment proceeding initiated. Settlement agreed by the 
parties and proceedings discontinued at their request 9 September 2009. 
 
4. LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/02/1, pending. Award in favour 
of the claimant for $57.4m was rendered on 25 July 2007. Request for 
supplementary decision was denied on 8 July 2008. The claimants request 
for annulment of the “necessity” defence section of the award is pending on 
the parties agreement 12 June 2009. 
 
5. Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic 
ICSID Case No Arb/01/3, pending. Award in favour of the claimant for 
$106.2m was rendered on 22 May 2007. Award rectification proceedings 
were concluded on 25 October 2007. Annulment proceedings are pending. 
 
6. Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/02/16, pending. Award in favour of the claimant for $128.2m was 
rendered on 28 September 2007. Annulment proceedings were concluded 7 
August 2009. Resubmission proceedings are pending. 
 
7. British Gas Group Plc v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL 2003, 
pending. Award in favour of the claimant for $185.2m was rendered on 24 
December 2007. Challenge of the award is pending before the Washington 
D.C. Courts. 
 
8. Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/03/9, concluded. Award in favour of the claimant for $2.8m was 
rendered on 5 September 2008. Claimants’ request for annulment of the 
“necessity” defence section of the award dismissing the request was 
concluded 16 September 2011. 
 
9. National Grid plc v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL 2003, concluded. 
Award was rendered in favour of the claimant for $54m on 3 November 
2008. 
 
10. Compania de Aguas del Aconcuija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/97/3, concluded. Award in favour 
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of the respondent was rendered 21 November 2000. Original award was 
annulled 3 July 2003. Award in favour of the claimant for $105 million was 
rendered 28 August 2007. 
 
11. El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No Arb/03/15, pending. Award was rendered in favour of the claimant 
for $43 million on 31 October 2011. Case is pending due to Annulment 
proceedings. 
 
12. EDF International, SAUR International and León Participaciones 
Argentinas v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/23, pending. 
Award in favour of the claimant for $136 million was rendered 11 June 
2012. Case is pending due to annulment proceedings. 
 
13. Impregilo S.p.A v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/07/17, 
pending. Award in favour of the claimant for $21.3 million was rendered 21 
June 2011. Case is pending due to annulment proceedings. 
 
Six of them are concluded and seven are still pending, five of the pending 
ones are in the middle of annulment proceedings, one is appealed to the 
Washington D.C. court and one is pending due to resubmission proceedings. 
An ICSID annulment tribunal has annulled two of the concluded cases. It 
was the case with Compania de Aguas del Aconquija and Vivendi Universal 
where the original tribunal first dismissed the claim in favour of Argentina. 
Another tribunal then annulled the first award. Then a third tribunal found 
that Argentina had breached its treaty obligation owing US$105 million in 
damages to the claimants. Also this award went under annulment 
proceedings, however the tribunal found that the decision was correct.135 
Also the Sempra v. Argentina case has been annulled and resubmission 
proceedings are now pending.136 
 
There are 52 publicly known cases against Argentina, 49 under ICSID and 
three under UNCITRAL. Half of these cases are concluded and half are still 
pending.137 As mentioned above some of the pending cases have been 
settled, however there are annulment proceedings that keeps them pending. 
Seven of the pending cases have been suspended on request of the parties. 
14 of the concluded cases has been discontinues, some due to lack of 
jurisdiction and some due to settlement agreement between the parties. 
Unfortunately these settlements are rarely public; therefore it is not possible 
to know what kind of settlement has been reached. Out of the concluded 
cases there is three that has been dismissed.138 The dismissed cases are 
Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/03/5, Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No Arb/04/14 and TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/05/5. 
                                                 
135 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic. 
136 Sempra v Argentine republic. 
137 See appendix. 
138 Facts collected by the author on icsid.worldbank.org and italaw.com, see appendix. 
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(3) The total amount of money that Argentina has been condemned to pay is 
US$1344.7 million. Since there has been 13 awards the average amount of 
damaged rendered is US$103.4 million per case.139 
 
There have been several awards with high amounts of damages and the 
average amount rewarded is about US$100 million per case. If Argentina 
were to pay this in all 52 cases there would be an enormous burden on the 
state. However, only six out of the twenty-six concluded cases has rendered 
awards, 23%. Even if the other seven pending cases with awards will stay 
enforceable when concluded the percentage would be 13 out of 32 (26+7) 
cases, 40.6%. Nonetheless one has to keep in mind that only three cases has 
been dismissed by ICSID tribunals, so there is a risk that several of the other 
pending cases will render awards. So van Harten might very well be correct 
when he claims that the high awards can put a strain on the host state 
economy. One can not forget that it is not only the awards that is costly for 
Argentina and other host states, the whole arbitration proceeding also costs 
a lot of money. The reason why Argentina is respondent in all of these cases 
is a severe financial crisis, however eight years has passes since they started 
recovering. Nonetheless it is important to remember that their economy 
might not be on top.140 
 
Van Harten criticises that the tribunals are able to award public funds to 
businesses. He means that only courts should be able to do this. On this 
point the author finds that Meyers has a point when looking at the historical 
perspective. Historically it has been diplomatic protection that has settled 
these disputes, however, the protections was not sufficient enough to 
promote foreign investments and therefore economic development. The 
former system did not function in the appropriate manner therefore the 
arbitral tribunals developed. National courts has also settled disputes 
historically and not fulfilled the demanded need from investors. The fact 
that there has been a resistance against an international appellate court 
shows that the international community is not interested in this solution. So 
it may not be the ideal method of settling claims that private tribunals 
awards public funds to private actors, but it seems to be the desired way in 
today’s international relationship between states and investors.  
6.4 Private method 
Van Harten claims that investment treaty arbitrators treat the system in the 
same way as commercial arbitration. He means that it is a private method 
used on public affairs, which is wrong since the parties are not equals. Van 
Harten differentiates investor-state arbitration and investment treaty 
arbitration. He says that in an investor-state arbitration the host state has the 
possibility to accept arbitration on a case-by case basis and in investment 
                                                 
139 See appendix and list of cases above. 
140 The authors own calculations and conclusions bases on information from 
icsid.worldbank.org and italaw.com. 
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treaty arbitration the host state gives one consent in the treaty and that 
consent is applicable on future investment disputes between the state and 
investors in the state.141 Like Alvarez above, this author finds no need to 
differentiate these two since it is the arbitration form in itself that van 
Harten critiques. The confidentiality is the same in both forms and the 
tribunals are constituted in the same manner. The use of a private method of 
dispute settlement has evolved due to the insufficiency of the former system 
of diplomatic protection. In investment treaty arbitration the states have 
given consent in the treaty that is applicable on all prospective disputes. 
This consent makes foreign investments more secure since the investors 
knows that they will be able to pursue arbitration in case of a wrong doing 
by the host state. Since the arbitration costs are high it is unlikely that an 
investor will bring a claim unless they are quite sure that they will gain 
something. Therefore there will most likely not be a huge amount of cases 
raised under arbitration where the host state has not committed a 
wrongdoing. Thus, investment treaty arbitration will most likely not be 
initiated unless the host state has done something that breaches the 
investment treaty and the investor is quite certain that they will receive 
damages. This gives an indication that the system of a general consent in a 
treaty will not be abused. 
6.5 Accountability 
The lack of accountability is based on several aspects according to van 
Harten. He argues that since there is no review by judges, it is hard to appeal 
and the awards are highly enforceable there is not enough accountability to 
the system. It is further argued in his book that it is wrong that the place of 
arbitration and the place of enforcement can be two different places.142 
 
There is no review by judges when it comes to the system of investment 
treaty arbitration and van Harten argues that it is very difficult to appeal 
under ICSID to get a second opinion on the case.143 This thesis will 
therefore look at the statistics when is comes to appeals through ICSID’s 
annulment proceedings regarding the Argentina cases.  
 
Out of the eleven ICSID awards rendering damages to the claimant, eleven 
of them have been submitted to annulment proceedings and one out of the 
two UNCITRAL cases has been appealed.144 A different tribunal than the 
one who decided the award handles the annulment proceeding. This shows 
that it is possible under ICSID to use a form of appellate body. If one is not 
satisfied with the result of the original arbitration one has the opportunity to 
make a request for annulment proceedings. This increases the accountability 
of the system since a wrong by one tribunal can be fixed by an annulment 
proceeding. In the case of Compañia de aguas del Aconquija and Vivendi 
                                                 
141 Van Harten, 2007, p. 124f. 
142 Van Harten, 2007, p. 153ff. 
143 Van Harten, 2007, p. 153ff. 
144 See appedix. 
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Universal S.A. v Argentina, an annulment tribunal annulled the original 
award, then a third tribunal decided on a second award.145 Also in the 
Sempra case the award was annulled.146 With the three awards that 
dismissed the claim made by an investor none was filed for annulment. The 
only dismissed case that was filed for annulment is the one mentioned above 
where an award was rendered by a third tribunal. So this shows that 
Argentina applied for an annulment in all cases decided against them, but 
only one of the investors filed for annulment on the awards that dismissed 
their claims.147 
 
Other sources than the ICSID and italaw WebPages show that Argentina has 
refused to pay the rendered awards making headline in the last few years. 
Despite the strong enforcement rules of ICSID, Argentine is putting it all to 
a test. As a way of making Argentina pay, the international community has 
barred them from international finance, making it harder and harder for 
Argentina not to pay since they need international finance. However 
Argentina can survive quite some time without the international finance 
since its economy is a lot stronger now. Nonetheless since ICSID is so 
closely linked to the World Bank, it is easy to exclude a country from 
international finance from the World Bank if they do not pay their awards. 
Many countries with weaker economies would not make it without the 
international finance and are therefore inclined to pay.148 
 
The author finds the strong enforcement of awards as a positive thing, like 
many others. Referring to Meyers again, it is important to look at the 
historical aspect of this. Foreign investment is a way of increasing global 
economic development, and if the investors cannot get damages for wrongs 
that are made by a host country, they will probably feel less secure when 
investing, which would be a negative thing for the global economy. It is 
possible for both the host state and the investor to seek annulment under 
ICSID. When annulment proceedings are pending the awards are not 
enforceable. The high number of annulment proceedings involving 
Argentina indicates that it is not as hard to appeal as van Harten argues. The 
enforcement is therefore not as absolute as van Harten states when he 
critiques that it is wrong with the strong enforcement when it is hard to 
appeal. It is possible to appeal and the issue is therefore not as imminent as 
van Harten might argue.  
6.6 Coherence 
Coherence is a central cornerstone within legal systems. It is important that 
different courts and tribunals reach similar decisions when facing 
comparable issues. In many legal systems this is addressed by using 
                                                 
145 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic. 
146 Sempra v. Argentine Republique. 
147 Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. Argentine Republic; Wintershall 
Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic; DaimlerChrysler Services AG v. Argentine 
Republic. 
148 Khayat, 2001. 
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appellate bodies. Since there does not exist one single appellate body within 
investment treaty arbitration and similar fact situation have got largely 
differing results van Harten means that the system is lacking in 
coherence.149 One case that van Harten highlights to prove his point is the 
CME case against the Czech Republic, the same case used to prove high 
awards. This case shows inconsistency in the decision process between the 
two tribunals, however, by looking at Argentina one may get an indication 
on if this is one out of many cases or if it is just one unique situation.  
 
To get an indication over the coherence within the cases involving 
Argentina one has examined if the tribunals, when taking decisions and 
rendering awards, have considered and looked at previous cases within the 
same area. Is it common that arbitrators take into account what other 
arbitrators have found in previous decisions? 
 
All awards in public cases have been examined to establish if there is 
coherence between the different tribunals. All of the awards do look at 
previous cases. Some rely on other decisions as a base for their own 
decision and some look at other cases more as a guideline.150 However, the 
tribunals are not bound by stare decisis but they do look at and respect 
precedence, resulting in increased coherence between the different tribunals.  
 
There is one common ground for all cases raised against Argentina after the 
financial crisis; Argentina has claimed that they are not liable for any breach 
of treaties since they mean that Argentina was in a state of necessity or 
emergency. By looking at how different tribunals have approached the 
necessity defence one may get an indication of how coherent the system 
really is. 
 
The first five awards that where rendered against Argentina after the 
financial crisis was CMS v. Argentina, LG&E v. Argentina, Sempra v. 
Argentina, Enron v. Argentina and BG v. Argentina. The tribunals 
approached the necessity defence in diverging ways. The different view on 
treaty stability and derogation from treaty obligations in economic crisis is 
shown by the diverging decision against Argentina. Out of the above named 
cases only the tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina accepted the necessity defence 
by basing it’s decision on the treaty exception found in the US-Argentina 
BIT and legitimizing the decision through the international customary law. 
The CMS, Sempra and Enron tribunals relied on international customary 
law alone when settling the claim (article 25 of the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Articles) 
and found Argentina guilty of breaching the BIT. A third way of solving the 
dispute was conducted by the BG tribunal and the annulment committee in 
the CMS case. The two tribunals used a two-step approach where the 
necessity defence under customary law was only considered when a breach 
                                                 
149 Van Harten, 2007, p. 164f. 
150 See appendix. 
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of a BIT had occurred.151 These different approaches to the necessity 
defence indicates that the coherence might be lacking in the system just as 
van Harten has claimed, however, these cases are settled around the same 
time making it hard to refer to other similar cases. The coherence is not 
complete in the system; however, the fact that tribunals refer to previous 
cases indicates an attempt at coherence.  
6.7 Openness 
Openness is another of the core aspects of public law according to van 
Harten. One of the main features of arbitration is however confidentiality. 
Investment treaty arbitration is a mixture of both of these legal systems. The 
disputes are settled by arbitration and it affects the economy of states 
making it public law pursuant to van Harten. He further means that dispute 
settlement involving states should not be confidential; it should be open to 
public scrutiny.152 The question is then how confidential the system really 
is? 
 
ICSID awards are available for the public. It is easy to find and read cases 
online, making it possible for more persons to access them. However, it is in 
principle almost exclusively the ICSID cases that are available for the public 
to read. Out of the 52 cases that the author of this thesis has been able to 
access, only three153 of them were not ICSID cases, they were decided under 
UNCITRAL. The fact that most other cases than the ICSID once are 
confidential makes it somewhat hard to meet this critique in any other way 
than saying that some cases are made public, however, it is not possible to 
say how many that are not. Van Harten might thus be correct when claiming 
that the investment treaty arbitration systems lacks in openness. 
 
Van Harten states that the US is going in the right direction when 
incorporating more openness in new BITs making the arbitration process 
more publicly available. Also the fact that NAFTA arbitration is not 
confidential anymore is a step in the right direction. As one will be able to 
see further on in this thesis, the U.S. is the one country where most 
arbitrators come from in the Argentina cases. The fact that the U.S. is going 
in the right direction and that many of the arbitrators comes from the U.S. 
and also the fact that the U.S. raises most cases, also shown below, may 
influence the arbitration outside of NAFTA and under older BITs to become 
more open in the process of arbitration. However, it is hard to say for certain 
anything other then the fact that a lot of investment treaty arbitration is 
confidential today, resulting in a lack of openness as van Harten argues. 
                                                 
151 CMS v. Argentina, LG&E v. Argentina, Sempra v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina and 
BG v. Argentina. See more information in the appendix. 
152 Van Harten, 2007, p. 159f. 
153 National Grid plc v. Argentine Republic; Anglian Water Group (AWG) ltd v. Argentine 
Republic, British Gas Group v. Argentine Republic.  
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6.8 Independence 
Independence is the fourth core feature of public law adjudication according 
to van Harten. It is important that judges and arbitrators are independent. To 
create independence at court judges are often tenured. Being tenured 
involves a fixed period of time that a judge will be a judge; the person 
cannot get fired when having tenure. Having a safe position creates 
independence since the judge will still have a job no matter how he or she 
decides in a case. Arbitrators lack this tenure and are appointed on a case-
by-case basis. Van Harten argues that this makes the arbitrators dependent 
on investors bringing claim, which in turn might make them inclined at 
deciding in the investors favour. Hence if the investors are happy with the 
outcome of arbitration then it is more likely that they will bring another 
claim or that new investors will see an opportunity at wining its case based 
on previous case outcome.154 This view was criticised by Meyers, Alvarez 
and Franck above. They all said that van Harten lacked support of this in 
awards and it was also said that deciding in favour of investors as a way of 
attracting new claims would be for the pot calling the kettle black since a 
biased system will eventually get abandoned leaving the arbitrators with no 
new disputes to settle through arbitration. If there is a bias, Alvarez, Meyers 
and Franck argues that it would show in the awards, therefore a study of the 
52 cases involving Argentina will be examined.  
6.8.1 Win-Loss rate 
To detect a bias the most apparent way of conduct would be to look at win-
loss rates. If disregarding the fact that annulment proceedings are pending in 
several cases where an award has been established there are 13 awards in 
favour of the claimant, where Argentina is to pay damages. In only three of 
the rendered awards the decision has been in favour of Argentina, and the 
claim has been dismisses. The win-loss rate is therefore 13-3. Only 18.7% 
of the awards have been dismisses by arbitral tribunals, making the win rate 
81.3%. This statistic indicates that most cases have been in favour of the 
investors. However, one must keep in mind that the arbitration costs alone 
are high, so it is likely that a company will only bring a claim if they are 
quite certain to win.155 
6.8.2 Number of appointments 
Another way of examining if there is a bias is to look at how many tribunals 
each arbitrator has been part of. If most arbitrators were only selected once 
or twice it would seem less advantageous for them to decide in favour of the 
investors since it may not have an affect on their future appointments.  
                                                 
154 Van Harten, 2007, p. 168. 
155 Look at appendix, 7.1.1, cases where an award has been issued. 
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156 
 
By looking at the table above one sees that a majority of both presidents and 
arbitrators have only been appointed once. There are 93 presidents and 
arbitrators all together and only three of them have been both president and 
arbitrator.157 51.5% of the presidents have only been appointed once. 58.7% 
of ordinary arbitrators have only been appointed once. In total the result is 
56.8%. This shows that the majority of all arbitrators involved in settling an 
investment dispute through investment treaty arbitration have only been 
appointed once. If you expand the rate to arbitrators that has been appointed 
once or twice the result for presidents are 72.7%, for ordinary arbitrators 
79.3% and the total of both presidents and ordinary arbitrators are 77.8%. 
This shows that most of the arbitrators have only been appointed once or 
twice. For an arbitrator that is not a frequent name in the investment treaty 
arbitration process the gains for deciding in favour of the investor as a way 
of increasing potential appointments seem rather unlikely.  
6.8.3 Arbitrators origin 
Van Harten also argues that arbitrators are citizens of the same countries, 
investment-exporting countries.158 Below is therefore a table of how many 
arbitrators there are from the same countries. 
159 
 
All in all there were arbitrators from 35 different countries. Fifteen of these 
countries had 1 arbitrator as a citizen. The U.S. was the country with most 
appointed arbitrators as their citizens, eleven and Spain with the second 
most, eight. However, one may see by examining the table that the majority 
of countries represented only have 1-3 appointed arbitrators as their citizens. 
 
                                                 
156 Based on information gathered by the auther from italaw.com and icsid.wordbank.org. 
157 The three arbitrators are Fransisco Rezek(CMS-case, Compania de Aguas del 
Aconquija- case and the LG&E-case), Piero Bernadini (El Paso- case, Unisys-case, Mobile-
exploration case, Houston Industries- case, pioneer-case, Wintershall-case and RGA 
insurance-case) and Christer Söderlund (Continental casualty company and sempra energy-
case). 
158 Van Harten 2007, p. 169f. 
159 Table based on information gathered by the author found on italaw.com and 
icsid.worldbank.org. 
Appointments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
President 17 7 5 4 - - - 
Arbitrator 37 13 2 5 2 3 1 
Total 54 20 7 9 2 3 1 
ARBITRATORS 
FROM THE 
SAME STATE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Amount of 
countries 
15 6 6 3 1 2 - 1 - - 1 
 47 
This shows that many of the arbitrators come from different countries; 
however, a relatively large amount of arbitrators come from the U.S. and 
Spain. Van Harten argues that since ICSID is to closely attached to the 
World Bank it would influence the appointed arbitrators so they are positive 
against the investment-exporting states.160 The World Bank is situated in the 
U.S. and mentioned above the U.S. is the country where most arbitrators 
come from. This is an indication that van Harten might be correct with the 
claim that many arbitrators come from the same countries, from investment-
exporting countries and that the fact that the World Bank does have an 
influence on appointed arbitrators.  
6.8.4 Home states 
To detect the bias in the awards an examination of the home states has been 
conducted. By looking at the home states of the investors one might see an 
indication of whether there is a connection between the arbitrators origin 
and the home states of the investors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
161 
 
 
It is nine countries that have been involved as home states in publicly 
available investment treaty disputes with Argentina. U.S. investors has 
raised twenty of the claims and Spain nine of them. The U.S. and Spain 
were also the two states where most arbitrators came from. This information 
may explain why so many arbitrators come from the U.S. and Spain, the 
link may be between home states and arbitrators origin. The investors 
choose one of the appointed arbitrators, and an investor might see it as an 
advantage that the arbitrator that they appoint is from their home country 
since they will speak the same language and share the same cultural and 
moral background. This information is one explanation for why so many 
arbitrators come from the U.S. and Spain; it may not be linked to the fact 
that the headquarters of the World Bank is situated in the U.S.  
 
 
                                                 
160 Van Harten, 2007, p. 170f. 
161 Information gathered and compiled by the auther from italaw.com and 
icsid.worldbank.org. See appendix. 
Countries Claims against Argentina 
Unites States of America 20 
Spain 9 
France 7 
Italy 5 
Germany 4 
Belgium-Luxemburg 3 
United Kingdom  3 
Chile 2 
Netherlands  1 
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7 Conclusion 
The system of investment treaty arbitration is both praised and strongly 
criticised. The views and opinions concerning the system run over a broad 
spectrum. Gus van Harten finds the system highly inappropriate as a way of 
settling regulatory disputes. Others like Meyers, Franck and Alvarez finds it 
functioning very well. They see the system with completely different eyes 
which makes it hard for them to understand the others point of view.  
 
The system is not perfect; it is a young system that is still developing. A lot 
of issues have been raised in this thesis; some have been confirmed through 
the study of Argentina and some have been rejected due to empirical facts. 
Van Harten has a lot of points with his critique and it is important with 
critique for the system to be able to develop into its full potential. There is 
still a long way to go, but the development seems to be in the right direction.  
 
The investment treaty arbitration system has provided investors with more 
safety and security when investing in a foreign state. Today investors are 
able to bring their own claims against a host state that has breached a treaty 
obligation; they are no longer dependent on diplomatic protection by their 
home state. This creates a positive investment climate in the world, 
something that hopefully will lead to economic development. Today with 
the global financial crisis it is important that foreign investments are being 
promoted so that it can help weaker economies to grow stronger.  
 
Van Harten had four main areas of critique against the system.  
 
1. The courts should solve regulatory disputes that may affect the 
public. The arbitration process cannot fulfil core features of dispute 
settlement since it lacks in accountability, openness, coherence and 
independence. 
 
The accountability is stronger than van Harten claims, it is possible to 
appeal and a lot of cases have been going through annulment proceedings 
under ICSID. However, since it is not possible to see the possibilities to 
appeal in other arbitration institutes it is hard to say for certain that the 
system is entirely accountable. Van Harten’s critique is therefore not 
legitimate when it comes to ICSID arbitration, although it might be with 
other institutes.  
 
The openness is not as good as it could or should be, today one can find 
awards online, however, it is not possible to know how many one cannot 
find. The openness is therefore not complete and Van Harten’s critique is 
therefore legitimate to a certain extent on this point. 
 
The coherence is going in the right direction, the tribunals do look at 
previous cases but they are not bound to do it. Awards with similar facts 
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have been decided in different ways leaving the coherence unfulfilled. Van 
Harten has a point when claiming a lack of coherence, however, the system 
is becoming more and more coherent so the issue might not be as imminent 
as claimed by van Harten.  
 
 
2. The way of settling disputes through investment treaty arbitration is 
unlike any other system of international law, the system gives a 
private actor a lot of power. 
 
It is true that the system is unlike any other within international law. The 
investors do have a lot of power in investment treaty arbitration since they 
are the only part that can raise a claim. However, this author does not see 
that as a problem as van Harten does. The possibility for arbitrators to seek 
arbitration creates a secure investment climate, which promotes foreign 
investment. 
 
3. Van Harten claims that there is a bias in favour of the investors. This 
due to the arbitrator’s lack of tenure, which makes them dependent 
on prospective claims, claims that only the investors can bring. 
 
The claimed perceived bias in favour of investors seems rather unlikely 
when studying Argentina. As Alvarez said, intentionally deciding in favour 
of investors would harm the system in the long run since it would not be 
accountable anymore. Being subjective would therefore leave the arbitrators 
without jobs in the future since no state or investor would utilise a dispute 
settlement system that is not objective.  
 
4. The system can put a strain on host state economies due to its high 
awards and strong enforceability.  
 
The damages that has been rendered in the awards has in some cases been 
very high, putting an strain on the host states economy. However, one has to 
keep in mind that the host state has most likely gained a lot of money when 
receiving an increased amount of foreign investors due to the added security 
that a BIT can bring. The risk of facing arbitration and the cost it brings 
might not be as imminent as the gain a state might get from foreign 
investments. If they are to pay damages, it means that the host state has 
breached a BIT, and breaching a treaty or any other contract has its 
consequences.  
 
All in all one can say that van Harten has a lot of good point with his 
critique, nevertheless, the critique is exaggerated. The issues raised are not 
as imminent as van Harten portrays them. The system works a lot better 
than the previous one with diplomatic protection. It is therefore not 
necessary to alter it the was van Harten desires, changing it would leave the 
investors uncertain about the rights and possibilities, something that would 
risk their will at investing, which could be very harmful for the economic 
development. The system is developing in the right direction and hopefully 
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the deficiencies that do exist will vanish when the system evolves and grows 
more mature. Rome was not built in one day, nor will this system be.  
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Appendix 
7.1 Information about the Argentina 
Cases162 
7.1.1 Cases where an Award has been Issued 
1. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case 
No Arb/01/8  
Gas transportation 
Home state: U.S. 
Date Registered: 24 August 2001  
Award in favour of the claimant for $133.2m rendered on 12 May 2005 
Annulment proceedings rejecting the application concluded 25 September 
2007. 
 
Original tribunal:  
President:  Francisco Orrega Vicuna (Chile) 
Arbitrators:  Marc Lalond (Canada) 
Francisco Rezek (Brazil) 
 
Annulment tribunal: 
President: Gilbert Guillaume (France) 
Arbitrators: Nabil Elaraby (Egypt) 
 James R Crawford (Australia) 
 
2. Azurix v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No Arb/01/12  
Water and sewer services concession 
Home state: U.S. 
Date Registered: 23 October 2001  
Award in favour of the claimant for $165.2m rendered on 14 July 2006 
Annulment proceedings rejecting the application concluded 1 September 
2009. 
 
Original Tribunal: 
President:  Andrés Rigo Sureda (Spain) 
Arbitrators: Marc Lalond (Canada) 
 Daniel H Martins (Uguguay) 
 
Annulment tribunal: 
President: Gavan Griffith (Australia) 
Arbitrators: Bola Ajibola (Nigeria) 
 Michael Whang (Singapore) 
 
                                                 
162 All information is gathered from italaw.com and icsid.worldbank.org 
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3. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/02/8 
Informatic services contract 
Home state: Germany 
Date Registered: 17 July 2002;  
Award in favour of the claimant for $208.7m rendered on 6 February 2007 
Annulment proceeding initiated. 
Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their 
request 9 September 2009. 
 
Original Tribunal: 
President:  Andrés Rigo Sureda (Spain) 
Arbitrators: Charles N Brower (U.S) 
 Domingo Bello Janiero (Spain) 
 
Annulment tribunal: 
President: Gillbert Guillame (France) 
Arbitrators: Florentino P Feliciano (Philippines) 
 Muhammed Shahabuddeen (Guyana) 
 
Revision tribunal: 
President:  Andrés Rigo Sureda (Spain) 
Arbitrators: Charles N Brower (U.S) 
 Domingo Bello Janiero (Spain) 
 
4. LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International 
Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/02/1 
Gas distribution  
Home state: U.S. 
Date Registered: 31 January 2002  
Award in favour of the claimant for $57.4m rendered on 25 July 2007 
Request for supplementary decision denied on 8 July 2008  
Claimants request for annulment of the “necessity” defence section of the 
award pending on the parties agreement 12 June 2009. 
 
Original Tribunal: 
President: Tatiana Bogdanowsky de Maekelt (Venezuela) 
Arbitrators: Fransisco Rezek (Brazil) 
 Albert Jan van den Berg (Netherlands) 
 
5. Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic 
ICSID Case No Arb/01/3 
Gas transportation  
Home state: U.S. 
Date Registered: 11 April 2001 
Award in favour of the claimant for $106.2m rendered on 22 May 2007 
Award rectification proceedings concluded on 25 October 2007  
Annulment proceedings are pending. 
 
Original Tribunal: 
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President:  Francisco Orrega Vicuna (Chile) 
Arbitrators:  Albert Jan van den Berg (Netherlands) 
 Pierre-Yves Tschanz (Switzerland/Ireland) 
 
Annulment tribunal: 
President: Gavan Griffith (Australia) 
Arbitrators: Patrick L Robinson (Jamaica) 
 Per Tresselt (Norway) 
 
Resubmission tribunal: 
President: Cecile W M Abraham (Malaysia) 
Arbitrators: Kamal Hossein (Bangladesh) 
 David A R Williams (New Zealand) 
 
6. Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/02/16 
Gas supply and distribution  
Home state: U.S. 
Date Registered: 6 December 2002  
Award in favour of the claimant for $128.2m rendered on 28 September 
2007 
Annulment proceedings concluded 7 August 2009, award annulled. 
Resubmission proceedings pending. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Francisco Orrega Vicuna (Chile) 
Arbitrators: Marc Lalond (France) 
 Sandra Morelli Rico (Colombia) 
 
Annulment proceedings: 
President: Christer Söderlund (Sweden) 
Arbitrators: David A O Edward (UK) 
 Andreas J Jacovides (Cyprus) 
 
Resubmission tribunal: 
President: Vaughan Lowe (UK) 
Arbitrators: Kamal Hossein (Bangladesh) 
 David A R William (New Zealand) 
 
7. British Gas Group Plc v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL 2003 
Gas distribution  
Home state: United Kingdom 
Award in favour of the claimant for $185.2m rendered on 24 December 
2007  
Challenge of the award pending before the Washington D.C. Courts. 
Original tribunal: 
President:  Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez (Mexico) 
Arbitrators:  Alejandro M Garro (Argentina) 
 Albert Jan van den Berg (Netherlands) 
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8. Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No Arb/03/5 
Motor vehicle enterprise  
Home state: Chile 
Date Registered: 7 April 2003  
Award denying jurisdiction rendered on 6 June 2008. 
 
Original Tribunal: 
President:  Rodrigo Oreamuno (Costa Rica) 
Arbitrators: Duncan H Cameron (U.S.) 
 Jean Paul Chabaneix (Peru) 
 
9. Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/03/9 
Insurance company  
Home state: U.S. 
Date Registered: 22 May 2003 
Award in favour of the claimant for $2.8m rendered on 5 September 2008  
Claimants’ request for annulment of the “necessity” defence section of the 
award dismissing the request concluded 16 September 2011. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President:  Giorgio Sacerdoti (Italy) 
 V.V. Veeder (UK) 
 Michell Nader (Mexico) 
 
Annulment tribunal: 
President: Gavan Griffith (Australia) 
Arbitrators: Bola Ajibola (Nigeria) 
 Christer Söderlund (Sweden) 
 
10. National Grid plc v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL 2003. 
Electricity transmission  
Home state: United Kingdom 
Award rendered in favour of the claimant for $54m on 3 November 2008. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President:  Andrés Rigo Sureda (Spain) 
Arbitrators: Alejandro M Garro  (Argentina/ U.S.) 
 Judd L Kessler (U.S.) 
 
11. Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No Arb/04/14 
Gas and Oil Production  
Home state: Germany 
Date Registered: 15 July 2004 
Award denying jurisdiction rendered on 8 December 2008. 
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Original Tribunal: 
President:  Fali S. Nariman (India) 
Arbitrators:  Santiago Torred Bernardez (Spain) 
 Piero Bernardini (Italy) 
 
12. TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No Arb/05/5 
Home state: Netherlands 
Telecommunications service provider  
Date Registered: 8 April 2005  
Award denying jurisdiction rendered on 19 December 2008. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President:  Hans Danelius (Sweden) 
Arbitrators:  Georges Abi-Saab (Egypt) 
 Grant D Aldonas (U.S.) 
 
13. Compania de Aguas del Aconcuija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/97/3 
Water supply 
Home state: France 
Date Registered: 19 February 1997 
Award in favour of the respondent rendered  21 November 2000 
Original award annulled 3 July 2003 
Award in favour of the claimant for $105 million 28 August 2007. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Francisco Rezek (Brazil) 
Arbitrators: Thomas Buergenthal (U.S.) 
 Peter D Trooboff (U.S) 
 
Annulment tribunal: 
President:  L Yves Fortier (Canada) 
Arbitrators: James R Crawford (Australia) 
 José Carlos Fernández Rozas (Spain) 
 
Resubmission tribunal: 
President: J William Rowley (Canada) 
Arbitrators: Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler (Switzerland) 
 Carlos Bernal Verea (Mexico) 
 
Second annulment tribunal: 
President:  Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri (Egypt) 
Arbitrators: Andreas J Jacovides (Cyprus) 
 Jan Hendrik Dalhuisen (Netherlands) 
 
14. El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No Arb/03/15 
Hydrocarbon and Electricity Concessions  
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Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 12 June 2003 
Award rendered in favour of the claimant for $43 million on 31 October 
2011. 
Pending due to Annulment proceedings. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President:  Lucius Caflish (Switzerland) 
Arbitrators:  Piero Bernadini (Italy) 
 Brigitte Stern (France) 
 
Annulment tribunal: 
President: Rodrigo Oreamuno (Costa Rica) 
Arbitrators: Theresa Cheng (China) 
 Rolf Knieper (Germany) 
 
15. Houston Industries Energy Inc and others v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No Arb/98/1 
Energy supply 
Home state: U.S. 
Date Registered: 25 February 1998 
Award rendered 24 August 2001, not public. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President:  Piero Bernardini (Italy) 
Arbitrators:  Santiago Torres Bernárdez (Spain) 
 Albert Jan van den Berg (Netherlands) 
 
16. EDF International, SAUR International and León Participaciones 
Argentinas v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/23 
Electricity Distribution  
Home state: France and Belgium-Luxemburg 
Date registered: 12 August 2003 
Award in favour of the claimant for $136 million rendered 11 June 2012 
Pending due to annulment proceedings. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: William W Park (U.S.) 
Arbitrators: Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler (Switzerland) 
 Jesús Rémon (Spain) 
 
17. Impregilo S.p.A v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/07/17 
Water services concession  
Home state: Italy 
Date registered: 25 July 2007 
Award in favour of the claimant for $21.3 million rendered 21 June 2011. 
Pending due to annulment proceedings. 
 
Original tribunal: 
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President:  Hans Danlius (Sweden) 
 Charles N Brower (U.S.) 
 Brigitte Stern (France) 
 
Annulment tribunal: 
President: Rodrigo Oreamundo (Costa Rica) 
Arbitrators: Eduardo Zuleta (Colombia) 
 Theresa Cheng (China) 
 
18. DaimlerChrysler Services AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/05/1  
Leasing and Financial Services  
Home state: Germany 
Date registered: January 14, 2005 
Award in favour of the respondent rendered 22 August 2012, not public. 
 
Original tribunals: 
President: Pierre-Marie Dupuy (France) 
Arbitrators: Charles N Brower (U.S.) 
 Domingo Bello Janeiro (Spain) 
7.1.2 Pending Cases 
1. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Interagua 
Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/03/17 
Water services concession  
Home state: Spain and France 
Date registered: 17 July 2003 
Jurisdictional phase concluded 
Hearing on the merits concluded in November 2007 
Proceedings resumed pursuant to a request for disqualification of an 
arbitrator declined on 12 May 2008. 
Decision on liability in favour of the claimant 20 July 2010 
Await award. 
 
Original Tribunal: 
President: Jeswald W Salacuse (U.S.) 
Arbitrators: Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler (Switzerland) 
 Pedro Nikken (Venezuela) 
 
2. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., Vivendi 
Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/19 
Water and sewer services concession  
Home state: Spain and France 
Date registered: 17 July 2003 
Hearing on the merits concluded in November 2007 
Procedural order issued 18 August 2012. 
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Original tribunal: 
President: Jeswald W Salacuse (U.S.) 
Arbitrators: Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler (Switzerland) 
 Pedro Nikken (Venezuela) 
 
3. AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL 2003 
Water and sewer services concession  
Home state: United Kingdom 
Date registered: 17 July 2003 
Hearing on the merits concluded in November 2007 
Decision on liability in favour of the claimant 30 July 2010 
Awaits award. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Jeswald Salacuse (U.S.) 
Arbitrators: Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler (Belgium) 
 Pedro Nikken (Venezuela) 
 
4. Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/04/1 
Gas Transportation / Power Generation / Gas and Oil Production 
Home state: France 
Date registered: 22 January 2004  
Decision on liability in favour of the claimant 27 December 2010 
Awaits award. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Giorgio Sacerdoti (Italy) 
Arbitrators: Henri C Álvarez (Canada) 
 Luis Herrera Marcano (Venezuela) 
 
5. Mobil Exploration and Development Inc. Suc. Argentina and Mobil 
Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/04/16 
Gas Production  
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 5 August 2004 
Tribunal constituted on 14 August 2008. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Gustaf Möller (Finland) 
 Piero Bernardini (Italy) 
 Antonio Remiro Brotóns (Spain) 
 
6. Asset Recovery Trust S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/05/11 
Collection contract  
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 23 June 2005 
Stayed for non-payment. 
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Original tribunal: 
President: Jaime C Irarrázabal (Chile) 
Arbitrators: Ernesto Canales Santos (Mexico) 
 Antonio A. Cancado Trindade (Brazil) 
 
7. Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/07/5  
Bondholders  
Home state: Italy 
Date Registered: 7 February 2007 
Decision on jurisdiction and admissibility 4 August 2011 
Request for disqualification 15 September 2011. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Pierre Tercier (Switzerland) 
Arbitrators: Santiago Torres Bernárdez (Spain) 
 Albert Jan van den Berg (Netherlands) 
 
8. Giovanni Alemanni and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/07/8 
Bondholders 
Home state: Italy 
Date registered: 27 March 2007 
Tribunal constituted on 3 July 2008. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President:  Franklin Berman (U.K.) 
Arbitrators: Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel (Germany) 
 J. Christopher Thomas (Canada) 
 
9. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Biskaia, Bilbao Biskaia 
Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/07/26  
Water services concession 
Home state: Spain 
Date registered: 1 October 2007 
Decision on disqualification dismissed 12 September 2011.  
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Andreas Bucher (Switzerland) 
Arbitrators: Campbell McLachlan (New Zealand) 
 Pedro J. Martínez-Fraga (U.S.) 
 
10. HOCHTIEF Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No Arb/07/31 
Highway construction contract  
Home state: Germany 
Date registered: 18 December 2007 
Decision granting jurisdiction on 24 October 2011. 
 
Original tribunal: 
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President: Vaughan Lowe (U.K.) 
Arbitrators: Charles N. Brower (U.S.) 
 J. Christopher Thomas (Canada) 
 
11. Giordano Alpi and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/08/9  
Bondholders  
Home state: Italy 
Date registered: 28 July 2008 
Tribunal constituted on 5 December 2008. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Bruno Simma (Germany/Austria) 
Arbitrators: Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel (Germany) 
 Santiago Torres Bernárdez (Spain) 
 
12. Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanias S.A. and Autobuses 
Urbanos del Sur S.A v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/09/1 
Transportation 
Home state: Spain 
Date Registered: 30 January 2009 
The tribunal issued procedural orders on 3 October 2012. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Thomas Buergenthal (U.S.) 
Arbitrators: Henri C. Álvarez (Canada) 
 Kamal Hossain (Bangladesh) 
7.1.3 Proceedings Suspended or Discontinued 
1. AES Corporation v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/02/17 
Electricity generation and distribution  
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 19 December 2002 
Jurisdictional phase concluded 
Suspended by agreement of the parties on 23 January 2006. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Pierre-Marie Dupuy (France) 
Arbitrators: Karl-Heniz Böckstiegel (Germany) 
 Domingo Bello Janeiro (Spain) 
 
2. Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/03/2 
Gas Supply and Distribution  
Home state: Belgium- Luxemburg 
Date registered: Date registered: 27 February 2003 
Proceedings suspended at the request of the parties. 
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Original tribunal: 
President: Francisco Orrego Vicuna (Chile) 
Arbitrators: Marc Lalonde (Canada) 
 Sandra Morelli Rico (Colombia) 
 
3. Compañía General de Electricidad S.A. and CGE Argentina S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/05/2 
Electricity Distribution  
Home state: Chile 
Date registered: 4 February 2005 
Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at the request 
of the claimants. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Pierre Tercier (Switzerland) 
Arbitrators: Henri C. Álvarez (Canada) 
 Georges Abi-Saab (Egypt) 
 
4. Electricidad Argentina S.A. and EDF International S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/22 
Electricity Distribution  
Home state: France 
Date registered: 12 August 2003 
Tribunal constituted on 2 June 2004 
Suspended by agreement of the parties on February 5, 2008. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President:  William W Park 
Arbitrators: Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler (Switzerland) 
 Fernando de Trazegnies Granda (Peru) 
 
5. Enersis S.A. and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/03/21 
Electricity Distribution  
Home state: Spain 
Date registered: 22 July 2003 
Tribunal constituted on 21 January 2004 
Suspended by agreement of the parties on 28 March 2006. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Roberto Maclean (Peru) 
Arbitrators: Luis Herrera Marcano (Venezuela) 
 Robert Volterra (Canada) 
 
6. Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/03/10 
Gas Supply and Distribution  
Home state: Spain 
Date Registered: 29 May 2003 
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Jurisdictional phase completed 
Suspended by agreement of the parties on 11 November 2005. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Andreas F Lowenfeld (U.S.) 
Arbitrators: Henri C. Álvarez (Canada) 
 Pedro Nikken (Venezuela) 
 
7. SAUR International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/04/4 
Water and sewer services concession 
Home state: France 
Date registered: 27 January 2004 
Jurisdictional phase concluded 
Suspended by agreement of the parties on 7 April, 2006. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Juan Fernández-Armesto (Spain) 
Arbitrators: Bernard Hanotiau (Belgium) 
 Christian Tomuschat (Germany) 
 
8. Telefónica S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/20 
Telecommunications service provider  
Home state: Spain 
Date registered: 21 July 2003  
Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their 
request. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Giorgio Sacerdoti (Italy) 
Arbitrators: Charles N Brower (U.S.) 
 Eduardo Siqueiros T. (Mexico) 
 
9. Unisys Corporation v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/27 
Information Storage and Management Project  
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 15 October 2003 
Tribunal constituted on 3 September 2004 
Suspended by agreement of the parties on 26 October 2004. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Juan Fernández-Armesto (Spain) 
Arbitrators: Piero Bernardini (Italy) 
 Jean Paul Chabaneix (Peru) 
 
10. Aguas Cordobesas SA, Suez, and Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/18  
Water services concession  
Home state: Spain 
Date registered: 17 July 2003 
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Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their 
request on 24 January 2007. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Jeswald W. Salacuse (U.S.) 
Arbitrators: Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler (Switzerland) 
 Pedro Nikken (Venezuela) 
 
11. BP America Production Company and others v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/04/8  
Hydrocarbon Concessions and Power Generation  
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 27 February 2004 
Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their 
request on 20 August 2008. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President:  Lucius Caflish (Swizerland) 
Arbitrators: Brigitte Stern (France) 
 Albert Jan van den Berg (Netherlands) 
 
 
12. Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/03/7 
Electricity distribution and transportation  
Home state: Belgium - Luxemburg 
Date registered: 23 April 2003 
Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their 
request on 25 January 2007. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Enrique Goméz-Pinzón (Colombia) 
Arbitrators: Henri C. Álvarez (Canada)  
 Hector Gros Espiell (Uruguay) 
 
13. France Telecom S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/04/18  
Telecommunications service provider  
Home state: France 
Date Registered: 26 August 2004 
Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their 
request on 30 March 2006. 
 
14. Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration 
Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/13 
Hydrocarbon and Electricity Concessions 
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 6 June 2003  
Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their 
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request on 20 August 2008. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Lucius Caflish (Switzerland) 
Arbitrators: Albert Jan van den Berg (Netherlands) 
 Brigitte Stern (France) 
 
15. Pioneer Natural Resources Company, Pioneer Natural Resources 
(Argentina) S.A. and Pioneer Natural Resources (Tierra del Fuego) S.A. 
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/12 
Hydrocarbon and Electricity Concession 
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 5 June 2003 
Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their 
request on 23 June 2005. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Lucius Caflisch (Switzerland) 
Arbitrators: Piero Bernardini (Italy) 
 Brigitte Stern (France) 
 
 
16. RGA Reinsurance Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/04/20  
Financial Reinsurance Services  
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 11 November 2004 
Settlement agreed by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their 
request on 14 September 2006. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Fali S. Nariman (India) 
Arbitrators: Piero Bernardini (Italy) 
 Georges Abi-Saab (Egypt) 
 
17. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/03/30 
Water and sewer services concession  
Home state: U.S. 
Date Registered: 8 December 2003 
Discontinued due to lack of payment. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Gustaf Möller (Finland) 
Arbitrators: Bernard Hanotiau (Belgium) 
 Donals M. McRae (New Zealand/Canada) 
 
18. CIT Group Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/04/9 
Leasing Enterprise  
Home state: U.S. 
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Date registered: 27 February 2004 
The proceeding was discontinued pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 44. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Pierre-Marie Dupuy (France) 
Arbitrators: Claus von Wobeser (Mexico) 
 Christian Tomuschat (Germany) 
 
19. Lanco International Inc v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
Arb/97/6 
Rubber tire manufacturer 
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 14 October 1997 
Proceeding discontinued at Claimant’s request 17 October 2000. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Bernardo M. Cremades (Spain) 
Arbitrators: Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez (Mexico) 
 Luiz Olavo Baptista (Brazil) 
 
20. Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No Arb/99/4 
Electricity supply 
Home state: Spain/Chile 
Date registered: 12 July 1999 
Proceedings discontinued at Claimant’s request 8 February 2001. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President: Rodrigo Oreamuno (Costa Rica) 
Arbitrators: Enrique Elías (Peru) 
 Héctor Gros Espiell (Uruguay) 
 
21. Mobil Argentina S.A v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/99/1 
Oil and Gas 
Home state: U.S. 
Date registered: 9 April 1999 
Proceedings discontinued at Claimant’s request 21 July 1999. 
 
Tribunal not official 
 
22. Impregilo S.p.A v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No Arb/08/14 
Highway construction concession  
Home state: Italy 
Date registered: 15 October 2008 
Tribunal not yet constituted. 
 
Original tribunal: 
President:  Hans Danelius (Sweden) 
 Charles N. Brower (U.S.) 
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 Kamal Hossein (Bangladesh) 
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